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THESIS

**WINNING THE STRATEGIC NARRATIVE IN THE
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PROTRACTED CONFLICT**

by

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December 2012

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PROTRACTED CONFLICT**

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to identify the reasons for Israeli and Palestinian religious objections to peaceful co-existence in a two-state solution to the conflict over the land between the Jordan River and Mediterranean Sea. Developing an understanding of the basic religious requirements and precedents, while consistently considering religious impact in politics, may help to open dialogue between Jewish Gush Emunim and Muslim Palestinian Hamas, strong opponents to land compromise.

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I. BACKGROUND, LITERATURE REVIEW, HYPOTHESES

If this [peace] is to be achieved, man must evolve for all human conflict a method which rejects revenge, aggression and retaliation. The foundation of such a method is love. The tortuous road which has led from Montgomery, Alabama, to Oslo bears witness to this truth.

— Dr. Martin Luther King Jr,
Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech

A. PROBLEM

Jihadists often use the violence and fatalities in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a propaganda tool against U.S strategic interests, hurting the U.S. national security. This thesis examines how and whether the United States’ religiously-uninformed and inconsistent involvement in the conflict has resulted in limited influence in the region. It argues that one reason why a solution to the Israeli- Palestinian conflict has been unsuccessful is because the United States has failed to adequately take into account relevant religious issues.¹ This is not unique to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, however. “Government agencies, think tanks, and the military...in the past had ignored the relationship of religion to politics and international affairs.”² As former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright once remarked,

In order to effectively conduct foreign policy today, you have to understand the role of God and religion ... My sense is that we don’t fully *understand*, because one, it’s pretty complicated, and two, everyone in the U.S. believes in a separation of church and state, so you think, “Well, if we don’t believe in the convergence of church and state, then perhaps we shouldn’t worry about the role of religion.” I think we do that now at our own peril. Religion is instrumental in shaping ideas and policies. It’s an essential part of everyday life in a whole host of countries. And obviously it plays a role in how these countries behave, so we need to know what the

¹Note: Jews and Muslims struggle for the land and political leadership, citing religious justification from their source texts, the Jewish Tanakh and Muslim Qur’an, explained further on page 7.

²John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, *Who Speaks for Islam?* (New York: Gallup Press, 2007), 163.

religious influence is ... I think that there was a *mistake* made, which was *not understanding how difficult* the issue of Jerusalem and the holy places would be.³

The United States has been particularly ignorant when dealing with Islamic countries. As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen once admitted, “The Muslim community is a subtle world we don’t fully-and don’t always attempt to—understand ... only through a shared appreciation of the people’s culture, needs and hopes for the future can we hope ourselves to supplant the extremist narrative.”⁴ Furthermore, Mullen argued, “we hurt ourselves when our *words don’t align with our actions*...I would argue that most strategic communications problems are not communication problems at all. They are policy and execution problems.”⁵

The role of religion has been particularly instrumental in shaping political relationships in the Middle East. Two years after the Egypt-Israeli Peace Agreement, President Reagan was recognized by Anwar Sadat for his faith and his efforts to build a bond between the two countries, “Mr. President...you are a great companion and a most reliable friend, and, like us in Egypt, you are a nation of believers [in God]. We shall do all that we can to bolster this friendship and intensify our cooperation in all fields. May God Almighty illuminate our way and guide our steps.”⁶ More relevant to this thesis, religious communities played a crucial role in helping South Africa end Apartheid, helped the United States end segregation, and the Community of Sant’Egidio (St. Giles), a Catholic lay association, has helped mediate peace settlements in Algeria, Uganda, the

³Madeleine Albright, “Ignore Religion ‘At Our Own Peril,’” 17 August 2007, accessed 21 September 2012 (emphasis added), http://articles.cnn.com/2007-08-17/us/albright.qa_1_foreign-policy-religion-god-s-warriors/2?_s=PM:U.S.. Note: Albright used to say, “Let’s not bring God and religion into it.”

⁴Thom Shanker, “Message to Muslim World Gets a Critique,” *The New York Times*, 27 August 2009, A9; Robert Baer, 2008. *The Devil we Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2008); Robert Baer, *Sleeping with the Devil: How Washington Sold our Soul for Saudi Crude* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2003).

⁵Mullen, Michael G., “Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 55, Quarter 4 (2009): 2.

⁶Sadat, Anwar, Presentation of the Collar of the Nile to President and Mrs. Nancy Reagan, 05 August 1981. From Reagan Presidential Library 19 June 2012. Note: Egypt is the birthplace of the Muslim Brotherhood, where Hamas also began. Hasan al-Banna was the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 in Egypt. Jim Lacey, *The Canons of Jihad: Terrorists’ Strategy for Defeating America* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 4.

Ivory Coast, Kosovo, Guatemala, Liberia, and Burundi.⁷ Cases like these are why Johnston and Sampson argue that “religious communities [need] to search their traditions for teachings that promote peace and to engage in critical self-examination of their respective approaches to conflict.”⁸ One could argue that nations also need to gain an understanding of the religious beliefs of the groups with which they interact.

Unfortunately, that is often not the case. For example, while U.S. policy toward the land of Israel has been disclosed,⁹ it is unclear whether it has been informed by the religious beliefs of Jews and Muslims even though the impact that such beliefs have had on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been substantial. Both religious Zionists and Jihadists refuse to surrender land they believe has been promised and given to them by God. Such beliefs have to be taken seriously if there is to be a resolution to the conflict.¹⁰ Both Hamas and Gush Emunim are key religious components of the cultures affecting the course and outcome of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and are seen by some as major blocking agents to any peace settlement over land sovereignty.^{11,12} As Madeleine Albright has noted:

Because the parties both believed that God gave them that little piece of land, we started playing with a term, which was that it belonged to God. *Divine sovereignty*. Anybody who’s been to Jerusalem can see why it is so complicated. Physically, religious holy places are completely intertwined, one on top of the other. So in many ways, there’s great appeal to saying it belongs to God.¹³

It is implied that God’s ownership of the land may suppress violent narratives.

⁷Monica Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Shah, *God’s Century, Resurgent Religion and Global Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2011), 174–206.

⁸Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 272, 312.

⁹Note: In this work, all future references to the land between the Jordan River and Mediterranean Sea will be called “the land.”

¹⁰Roy Lewicki, David Saunders, Bruce Barry, and John Minton, *Essentials of Negotiation* (New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2004), 46.

¹¹Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong?: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 59.

¹²Note: HAMAS: Harakat al Mawqawama al Islamiyya: “Islamic Resistance Movement.” HAMAS will be referred to as Hamas (non capital letters) in this thesis.

¹³Albright, “Ignore Religion ‘At Our Own Peril.’”

B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE:

This thesis's purpose is to identify the underlying causes for Palestinian Hamas's and Israeli Gush Emunim's religious objections to peaceful co-existence in the land between the Jordan River and Mediterranean Sea. Gaining such an understanding should help policy makers and analysts better address the conflict in Israel where struggles between the Gush Emunim and the Palestinian Hamas remain intense. It is important for interested parties to gain a better understanding of religious dimensions of the political positions in order to increase levels of trust and move toward peaceful solutions.¹⁴

In so doing, we need to recognize the “dramatic and worldwide *increase* in the political influence of religion has occurred in roughly the past forty years.”¹⁵ Contrary to much conventional wisdom, religion is not in decline; instead, it continues to be a powerful force for both good and ill in the world.¹⁶ Thus, gaining an understanding the religious motivations lying behind political movements is key to moving forward effectively.

Three concepts will substantially inform this study: *political theology*, *mutual independence* and *grace*. The first refers to “the set of ideas that a religious community holds about political authority and justice.”¹⁷ This concept is central to understanding important issues such as to what degree the particular religious community considers violence justifiable, the legitimacy of religious leaders in political office, and religious freedoms of minority or non-ruling religions in an area. The second, the “mutual independence of religious authority and political authority,” refers to the level of state control over religious expression of dominant and minority religions and explains much

¹⁴Psalm 138:8 (of David) “the Lord will perfect that which concerns me.”; Toft, Philpott and Shah, *God's Century*, 174–201.

¹⁵Toft, Philpott, and Shah, *God's Century*, 9.

¹⁶Toft, Philpott, and Shah, *God's Century*, 9; See also Peter L. Berger, “Secularism in Retreat.” *The National Interest* (1996): 3–12; Randall Collins. *The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change*: (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1998); John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge. *God is Back: How the Global Revival of Faith Is Changing the World* (New York: Penguin Press, 2009); Christian S. Smith (Ed.). *The Secular Revolution: Power, Interests, and Conflict in the Secularization of American Public Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Rodney Stark, “Secularization, R.I.P.” *Sociology of Religion* 60, no. 3 (1999): 249–273.

¹⁷Toft, Philpott, and Shah, *God's Century*, 9.

about the type of politics pursued by the government.¹⁸ *Grace* is unmerited favor. It is suggested that these concepts are latent in Judaism and Islam.¹⁹

This thesis's main argument is that politicians have largely ignored or manipulated religion and its role in politics, thus unintentionally creating space for conflicting parties to continue in armed conflict. And given the global increase in the influence of religion in politics, a greater understanding of each group's political theology can help decrease the *peace gap* through informed negotiations.²⁰ Moreover, understanding the religious determinants in the context of the political theology positions can also help the U.S. policy makers develop a clear understanding, maintain consistency, and articulate and elevate its strategic narrative.

Research into both Jewish and Muslim scriptures indicates that they contain precedents and principles for peace that can help initiate open dialogue, consider the religious perspectives of others, and resolve conflict with religious reasoning. This thesis intends to suggest ways for the United States to leverage these built-in norms in order to improve dialogue between the Israeli and Palestinian cultures. As such, it should have significant theoretical and policy applications in understanding and diffusing future conflicts containing a high degree of religiously motivated content.

This thesis focuses on the beliefs and practices of Hamas and the Gush Emunim. While these two groups do not represent the beliefs of all Muslim and Jewish religious groups, they do reflect the beliefs of some of the more influential groups. Thus, by exploring their beliefs and, by extension, the religious motivations lying behind the conflict, a reasonable decrease in tension based on religious argumentation becomes a possibility.

¹⁸Toft, Philpott, and Shah, *God's Century*, 10.

¹⁹Toft, Philpott and Shah, *God's Century*, 141; Douglas Johnston, *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Ehud Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination* (New York: Free Press, 1999), 164–165.

²⁰*Peace Gap*—the distance between competing entities, particularly religiously influential political entities, in coming to a solution (see also Methodology).

C. RESEARCH QUESTION: WHAT ARE THE RELIGIOUS DETERMINANTS OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT?

There are several resistance points to negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. Some theorists might erroneously point to Western ideals or Western hegemony,²¹ but causes of the conflict also include inflammatory conditions, such as uneducated publics and leaders, social justice issues, economic motivations, state-sponsored terrorism, retaliation for attacks, political culture, identity encroachment, and radicalization within the precepts of the religious texts.²² Marwan empirically demonstrated that in a study from 1976–1985, repression was found to increase the rate of collective action (social movement), increases in-group cohesion, and fosters “an environment conducive to further collective action by overcoming social cleavages and rearranging previously factional groupings into a unitary whole.”²³ This relationship between repression and collective action is affected by the perceived legitimacy of the government. Palestinians seek “cognitive liberation”²⁴ from “foreign origin of authorities, and the continuation of military presence” through collective action.²⁵ An assumption of this thesis is that the most emotionally charged conflicts arise from zeal for religious positions,²⁶ which in turn crystallizes collective identity.²⁷ Therefore, it will

²¹Lawrence Freedman, *Superterrorism: Policy Responses* (Malden, Mass: Blackwell Pub, 2002), 105–124. Vincent A. Sandoval, “FBI Experiences Confronting Accused: Rationalize, Project, Minimize,” 11 September 2010, Bagram; See also Michael R. Napier and Susan H. Adams, “Magic Words to Obtain Confessions” *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, October 1998, accessed 10 October 2012, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/fbi/interview_clues.pdf.

²²Marwan Khawaja, “Repression and Popular Collective Action: Evidence from the West Bank,” *Sociological Forum* 8, no. 1 (1993): 47–71.

²³Marwan Khawaja, “Repression and Popular Collective Action,” 47, 64–66; Note: “Of the 14 forms of repression studied, one form, home-to-home searches, significantly decreased the rate of collective action.”

²⁴Douglass McAdam, quoted in Marwan Khawaja, “Repression and Popular Collective Action,” 66.

²⁵Marwan Khawaja, “Repression and Popular Collective Action,” 66

²⁶Ehud Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother*, 8. Note: “Students of politics recognize today that political violence is almost always a behavioral bi-product of extremist, extraparliamentary, and extralegal social movements. According to this approach, the study of violence involves not just the systematic observation of the political use of physical force but also the study of the larger milieu of ideological and cultural extremism of the society in question.”

²⁷Marwan Khawaja, “Repression and Popular Collective Action,” 66.

only focus on the religious objections to a peaceful two state solution. Figure 1 depicts the West Bank and Gaza land that is disputed by Hamas and Gush Emunim.



Figure 1. Modern Israel Map
From: United Nations, accessed 14 May 2011, <http://www.unitednations.org>.

Religious Israeli and Palestinian claims to sovereignty in the land may be understood through a consideration of religious documents. Understanding the Jewish

position requires exploring significant themes of the Tanakh and the Talmud.²⁸ Similarly, understanding the Muslim position requires exploring significant themes of the Qur'an and Hadith.²⁹ Each side claims that their scriptures are inspired by God, and they draw on these writings to articulate reasons for why their claims to the land are valid while their opponents' claims are not. This thesis aims to examine each group's claims in the overall context of their respective scriptures to show the presence of alternative interpretations.

The religious debate has strong historical origins. Both Muslims and Jews make claims to the land, claiming descendants back to Abraham. Prior to Muhammad's 622 AD/CE hijrah to Medina and the birth of Islam, the early Jewish-Muslim relationship was peaceful since their beliefs share common foundations.³⁰ Nevertheless, Muslims claim the Jews, or "people of the book," disobeyed Allah, and therefore the

²⁸Note: *Tanakh* (Tanach): The compilation of Holy Jewish Hebrew Bible, including the 24 books making up the Torah (Pentateuch), *Nevi'im* (Prophets) and *Ketuvim* (Writings) sections—Gabriel Seed, The Rabbinical Assembly, e-mail 11 October 2012. *Talmud*: Rabbinical Judaism has always held that the books of the Tanakh were transmitted in parallel with a living, oral tradition. The Talmud is considered an authoritative record of rabbinic discussions on Jewish law, Jewish ethics, customs, legends and stories. It is a fundamental source of legislation, customs, case histories and moral exhortations. (The Torah "lists the rules" while the oral law deals with application.) The Talmud, ultimately, constitutes the authoritative redaction of Judaism's oral tradition. *Jewish Dictionary*, accessed 04 October 2012 <http://www.jewishdictionary.org>; Literally "teaching"; refers to the comprehensive collection of rabbinic teachings consisting of the Mishnah and Gemara. *Embracing Judaism* Ed. Simcha Kling (New York: The Rabbinical Assembly: 1999), 218.

²⁹Note: *Hadith*: News, reports, narrative record of the teachings or customs of Muhammad, not included in the Qur'an, but recorded by companions and family members. Authoritative ahadith (plural) collection authored by Imam Sahih al-Bukhari (816–870 CE) and Imam Abu'l-Husain 'Asakir-ud-Din Muslim (817–883 CE). For example, the number of times a day that a Muslim prays comes from the Hadith, not the Qur'an. Sunni Muslims are obliged by religious conviction to believe everything in the Hadith regarding Muhammad's words and actions. As for the basic obligation of Islam, and what relates to the tenets of faith, it is adequate for one to believe in *everything* brought by the Messenger of Allah and to credit it with absolute conviction free of any doubt. Whoever does this is *not obliged to learn the evidences of the scholastic theologians*. The Prophet did not require of anyone anything but what we have just mentioned, nor did the first four caliphs, the other prophetic Companions, nor others of the early Muslim community who came after them. al-Misri, *Umdat al-Salik*, 9 (emphasis added).

³⁰Ignaz Goldziher, *Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), Translated from the German, *Vorlesungen uber den Islam* (Heidelberg, 1910), 10; *Quran* 2:142. Hijrah refers to Muhammad's migration from Mecca to Medina, in 622, the beginning of the Muslim calendar. By Islamic law, it means leaving a place to seek sanctuary or freedom from persecution. www.islamic-dictionary.com. Note: Christian tradition utilizes BC designator for "Before Christ" and AD for "Anno Domini" or the year of the Lord. Muslims use AH from Latin "Anno Hegirae," beginning the calendar in 622 AD/CE, the year that Muhammad migrated (Hijrah) from Mecca to Medina, and the central historical event of early Islam. Since the Islamic calendar is purely lunar, as opposed to solar or luni-solar, the Muslim (Hijri) year is shorter than the Gregorian year by about 11 days. 27 October 2012, http://fisher.osu.edu/~muhanna_1/hijri-intro.html, http://wiki.answers.com/Q/What_marks_the_beginning_of_the_Muslim_calendar.

revelations contained within the Qur'an supersede those found in the Tanakh. Jews, of course, disagree and argue that despite their disobedience, God's promises to them are still valid. This disagreement inevitably led to conflict between the two groups, and over the years the two groups have sometimes coexisted peacefully and sometimes they have not. More recently, the 1917 Balfour Declaration, 14 May 1948 Israel Independence, 1967 Six-Day War, and 1993 Oslo Accord have added to the tension between the two groups.³¹

The Gush Emunim (i.e., "the bloc of the faithful") is an Israeli messianic/political movement, which formed in the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and is committed to establishing Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in order to increase the lobby for representation.³² It interprets the holy book, the Tanakh literally, if not selectively, and believes it the divine and inspired word of God.³³ It sees the history of Zionism and the State of Israel as a process toward fulfilling the Messianic prophecy that all of the land from Egypt to the Euphrates River will be part of Israel as it was several thousand years ago.³⁴ The group's beliefs influence mainstream Israelites, giving land-centered nationalism the highest form of religious virtue.³⁵

Hamas, an acronym of Harakat al Mawqawama al Islamiyya ("Islamic Resistance Movement"), was founded after the 1987 First Palestinian Intifada. It is a group of Muslim Palestinians, who interpret the Qu'ran literally. Its objections to land division focus primarily on Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza,³⁶ and it is motivated by the fact

³¹Note: The Balfour Declaration partitioned the Ottoman Palestine province; Israel gained the West Bank, Gaza and part of Jerusalem in the Six Day War.

³²Israel-Gush Emunim, U.S. Library of Congress, accessed 04 July 2012, <http://countrystudies.us/israel/102.htm>; Note: the Underground of Gush Emunim does not necessarily espouse the main theology.

³³Note: "The scholars involved in this task were consumed with the sense of mission that they were dealing with the sacred and eternal word of God, not mere "literature"; that their task was not to rewrite the text, but to convey its meaning faithfully." Rabbi Nosson Sherman, *Tanach: The Torah, Prophets, Writings: The Twenty-Four Books of the Bible* (Brooklyn: Mesorah Publications, 2007), xii.

³⁴Rabbi Eleazar Waldman, "The Struggle on the Road to Peace," *Artzi*, 3 (1983): 18,20; *Genesis* 15:18–21.

³⁵Professor Eliezer Siegel, "Radical Messianic Zionism," accessed 04 July 2012, <http://www.ucalgary.ca/~elsegal/index.html>.

³⁶Mideast website, "Hamas Charter: The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement," 18 August 1998, accessed 11 September 2011, <http://www.mideastweb.org/hamas.htm>.

that land that Allah had once given to the Palestinians was taken away and given to Jews and the state of Israel.³⁷ Actions such as this help confirm the strongly-held religious beliefs to (1) “not trust” Jews, (2) conduct jihad for land interests, and (3) resist non-Islamic occupation of the land. In a majority of contemporary jihadi opinion, western and Zionist influence in taking Muslim land out of Palestinian control justifies fighting. Table 1 provides a summary of significant historical events and land sovereignty in Israel.

Table 1. Significant Dates in Jewish and Palestinian History

2,064 BC/BCE ³⁸	Land of Canaan promised to Abraham (Abram, Ibrahim), Abrahamic Covenant by God.
1876 BCE	Israel (formerly called Jacob) departs Canaan for Egypt due to poor crop season
1446 BCE	Moses pleads with Pharaoh Amenhotep II in Egypt, “Let my people go!” back to Canaan.
1,400 BCE	Estimated time, Moses writes Torah, beginning of Jewish Tanakh (39 Old Testament writings).
1,010–970 BCE	Jewish 2 nd King David reigns in Israel, Davidic Covenant established.
970–930 BCE	Jewish King Solomon reigns in Israel, builds Jewish temple on Temple Mount, site of Abraham’s near sacrifice of son Isaac by God’s request.
722 BCE	Destruction and exile of northern Jewish Kingdom of Israel by Assyrians.
586 BCE	Destruction and exile of southern Jewish Kingdom (Judah) by Babylonians.
425 BCE	Prophet Malachai writings (last book of 39 OT writings), conclusion of Jewish Tanakh ³⁹
70 AD/CE	Destruction of Jewish temple by conquering Roman army, renames territory Palestine.
610 CE	Prophet Muhammad receives first revelations of Qur’an in Mecca (Saudi Arabia)
622 CE	Muhammad with seventy families hijrah from Mecca to Medina, beginning Muslim year 0 AH.

³⁷In 1948, Israel claimed independence, and recaptured lands that were at that time governed by Palestine. UN Resolution 181 only allowed for the partitioning of Ottoman ruled Palestine—see the United Nations, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181 (Partition Plan), accessed 28 May 2012, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/038/88/IMG/NR003888.pdf?OpenElement>. Following the 1967 Six Day War, UN Resolution 242 affirmed, “The establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the . . . withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.” See the United Nations, U.N. Resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, accessed 28 May 2012, <http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/2338418.81155968.html>.

³⁸Note: Christian tradition utilizes BC designator for “Before Christ” and AD from Latin “Anno Domini” or the year of the Lord. Muslims use AH from Latin “Anno Hegirae,” beginning the calendar in 622 AD/CE, the year that Muhammad migrated (Hijrah) from Mecca to Medina, and the central historical event of early Islam. Since the Islamic calendar is purely lunar, as opposed to solar or luni-solar, the Muslim (Hijri) year is shorter than the Gregorian year by about 11 days. A number of Jews, Christians, and Muslims do take the Hebrew Bible literally, so these dates (and the Mosaic authorship) are traditional not necessarily historical. Some scholars debate Moses’ authorship, and date some books later than the annotated dates. Author prefers BC/AD. 27 October 2012, http://fisher.osu.edu/~muhanna_1/hijri-intro.html, http://wiki.answers.com/Q/What_marks_the_beginning_of_the_Muslim_calendar.

³⁹Note: Some scholars date some books later than 425 BCE. Chronicles is last book listed in Tanakh. Malachi is the last book listed in Christian Old Testament.

625 CE	Muslims defeated by Meccan army, Jewish tribes Qaynuqah and Nadir expelled from Medina for collaborating
627 CE	Muslims defeat Meccan army at Battle of the Trench, resulting massacre of Jewish tribe Qurayzah for supporting Meccan army against Muslims.
630 CE	Mecca established as holiest city of Islam. Last Surahs of Qur'an revealed (chronologically): 2, 98, 64, 62, 8, 47, 3, 61, 57, 4, 65, 59, 33, 63, 24, 58, 22, 48, 66, 60, 110, 49, 9, and 5.
632 CE	Death of Islam Prophet Muhammad, end of revelations (begin 610–632 CE).
638 CE	Muslims conquer Jerusalem, becomes third holiest Muslim city after Mecca and Medina.
705 CE	al-Masjid al-Aqsa Mosque (Dome of the Rock) built by 'Abdul Malik ibn Marwan and finished by Al-Walid on site of original Jewish temple in Jerusalem, a source of Israeli-Palestinian tension.
1071–1099 CE	Seljuk Turkish rule of Jerusalem.
1099 CE	Crusaders conquer Jerusalem, establish four states in Palestine, Anatolia and Syria.
1187 CE	Kurdish general Saladin defeats Crusaders at battle of Hattin, Jerusalem under Islamic control.
1897 CE	First formal Zionist conference in Basel to create Jewish state in Ottoman province of Palestine.
1917 CE	Balfour Declaration gives British support to creation of Jewish homeland in Palestine.
1918 CE	End of Ottoman Empire (Sykes-Picot agreement), British and French
1920 CE	Mandates and protectorates established, disregard Arab independence promises.
1947 CE	UN Declaration 282, Partition Plan, End of British Mandate in Palestine
1948 CE	Israeli forces defeat five Arab invading armies, Israeli Independence 14 May.
1967 CE	Six-Day War, Israel defeats Arabs, Middle East religious revival, Jewish Jerusalem.
1973 CE	Egypt and Syria attack Israel on Yom Kippur, leads to 1979 Egypt-Israeli peace treaty between Egypt Anwar Sadat and Israel Menachem Begin, Israel releases Sinai, Egypt recognizes Israel.
1981 CE	Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat assassinated by Muslim extremists for cooperation with Israel.
1987 CE	Intifadah, Palestinian call for fighting regarding Israeli presence in West Bank (of Jordan River) and the Gaza Strip. Hamas publishes 14 December 1987 official communique.
1993 CE	Israel and Palestinians sign Oslo Accords, establishing a Palestinian government with some territorial control in Gaza and West Bank, conditional upon governance and controlling factions.
1994 CE	Jew kills Muslims in Hebron mosque, Hamas suicide bombers attack Jewish civilians, President Yitzak Rabin assassinated. Taliban takes power in Afghanistan.
2000 CE	Second Intifada, "al-Aqsa Intifada" post failure to negotiate beyond a Palestinian government per 1993 Oslo agreement and Ariel Sharon's visit to the al Aqsa Mosque.

Sources: Karen Armstrong, *Islam: A Short History* (New York: The Modern Library, 2000), xi–xxxiv; Earl Radmacher, *The Nelson Study Bible* (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1997), 2, 98, 174, 226, 351; Ignaz Goldziher, *Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), Translated from the German, Vorlesungen über den Islam (Heidelberg, 1910), 3–30; Maulana Muhammad Ali, *The Holy Qur'an* (Dublin: Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isa'at Islam Lahore Inc, 2002), I-26 to I-30; Glenn E. Robinson, "Hamas as Social Movement" in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 125. Note: A body of scholars also do not take the Tanakh or Qur'an works literally; in November 2012, fighting erupted between Israel and Hamas.

D. HYPOTHESES

1. Hypothesis A: Policy Inconsistencies

Ambiguous and contradictory U.S. narratives regarding Israel and Hamas increases both tension and space for competing religious entities. Political policy that ignores religious needs allows for unmet expectations and a heightened awareness of insecurities. Given the context of Palestinians who have felt alienated by Israeli government and their religious desires perceived as disregarded, the ambiguous and inconsistent U.S. messaging has encouraged the emergence of groups that appeal to the religious identity. The emergence of Hamas has been fueled by these inconsistencies that create identity uncertainty. Uncertainty created a demand for simplified information and emotional resonance.⁴⁰ The demand for information quickly became filled with doubt, distortion, and radicalization. Hamas's status has been encouraged by U.S. inconsistencies toward Israel and its handling of internal security.

2. Hypothesis B: Cultural Dogmatism

Dogmatic religious interpretations of scripture increase the intensity of the conflict. Within the religious source texts (Tanakh and Qur'an) and larger corpus of writings (Talmud and Hadith), there are verses that can be leveraged to incite violence. An examination of these minor verses and themes is essential to understanding what excites people to take violent action, without considering the major religious themes. Zealots utilize religious texts to justify violent action for the land.

3. Hypothesis C: Peace Promotion

Highlighting and aligning frames of peaceful co-existence within each religion decreases the intensity of the conflict.⁴¹ Research demonstrates that in the current frames,

⁴⁰*Emotional Resonance*—"the degree of 'emotional harmony and/or disjuncture' between ideology, practices or 'collective action frames and the emotional lives of potential recruits.'" Belinda Robnett, "Emotional Resonance, Social Location, and Strategic Framing." University of California, Irvine *Sociological Focus* 37, no. 3 (August 2004): 195–212.

⁴¹David A. Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 4 (1986), 464–481; *Temporary Peace*—Cessation of armed conflict for the purpose of subjecting ones' self to the rule of law in a particular state.

it is not possible to sufficiently address each of the objections to a possible peace agreement. Once religious fundamentalist groups become the key stakeholders of the conflict, they utilize their elevated political positions to marginalize and isolate alternative groups. Aligning frames and themes of political moderation and co-existence with the existing political narratives has the potential to open new dialogue and form new moderate political coalitions. The major themes of peaceful co-existence can be an effective counter message to be leveraged against the violence-enhancing minor themes. Successful negotiations require a full understanding of the reasons for religious objections, and other peaceful frames within the religious corpus of knowledge. This alternative peaceful framework can still satisfy the insecurities within each group, lead to emotional resonance, and satisfy *political theologies* that pragmatically incorporate religion as a source of political power.

E. METHODOLOGY

The methodology employed in this thesis is a comparative case study. First, it will explore and analyze U.S. policy, practice, and messages regarding Israel and Hamas. The intent is to determine whether the United States has been consistent in considering religious factors that may have contributed to increased tension and violence. Second, it will analyze the *political theology* narratives of Gush Emunim and Hamas in order to determine if a zone of possible agreement exists.⁴² Next, it will explore narratives within both religious traditions that promote peaceful non-violent practice of religion within politics. While understanding the sources of tension is important, presenting logical and clear peaceful frames that shorten the *peace gap* between factions is the ultimate goal of this work.⁴³ Finally, the thesis will offer proposals as to how these peaceful narratives can be used to help mediate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

⁴²*Political Theology*—as stated in introduction, political theology is the set of ideas that a religious community holds about political authority and justice, in Toft, Philpott, and Shah, *God's Century*, 9.

⁴³*Peace Gap*—the distance between competing entities, particularly religiously influential political entities, in coming to a solution.

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II. FACTORS THAT AFFECT INTENSITY OF CONFLICT

A. THE DANGERS OF POLICY INCONSISTENCY

The religious ideas about political authority and justice are important to competing cultures, so the *political theology* of competing groups must a component of political policy.⁴⁴ The U.S. preoccupation with its own image allows for inconsistency in considering the *political theology* of competing groups. Perceived inconsistency leads to enhanced insecurities, and perceptions of isolation and privilege. Therefore, groups act upon these perceptions in violent ways, such as *jihad* and *practical messianism* in order to achieve understanding and political goals.⁴⁵ This thesis is predicated upon the basic assumption that the United States hopes to mediate the violence.

The preoccupation with image gives the appearance that the United States is inconsistent in applying *political theology* in its strategic narrative. Some believe that dissatisfied actors who choose violence are responding to a series of internal insecurities. Researchers label this discontent *emotional resonance*, or “the degree of ‘emotional harmony and/or disjuncture’ between ideology, practices or ‘collective action frames and the emotional lives of potential recruits.’”⁴⁶ This will be explored in detail in Chapter III, but for now it is important for understanding how insecurities are exacerbated by inconsistencies. Jervis claims that states are “terribly concerned about their reputations for living up to their commitments.”⁴⁷ As such, leaders can become fixated on appearing

⁴⁴Toft, Philpott, and Shah, *God’s Century*, 9, 124–125.

⁴⁵*Practical messianism* “active redemption”—ideology is used to inspire actions that bring the redemptive process of restoring the land to the Jews to a zenith. *Jihad*—struggle, inner (against self) or external (against others) ideology is used to fight for the establishment of an Islamic state; See also Chapter II.

⁴⁶Schrock, Holden, and Reid, in Robnett, Belinda. Emotional Resonance, Social Location, and Strategic Framing. University of California, Irvine *Sociological Focus*, 37 No. 3: 195–212 (2004), 195–196.

⁴⁷Robert Jervis, “Perceiving and Coping with Threat,” in *Psychology and Deterrence*, ed. Richard Ned Lebow (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1985), 9. Note: Jervis applies the psychology of deterrence to states, and it is assumed that the same inferences can be made about major non-state actors and actors seeking statethood.

consistent, as Morgan describes, a “paradox of credibility.”⁴⁸ For instance, a leader may be uncertain about how to respond to a major challenge. As a result they are disposed to uphold lesser commitments in order to be able to safely fight, thereby promoting a consistent reputation, which discourages challenges. Morgan calls this “saving face” paradox an effort of policy makers to hide their insecurity over what to do when the vital interests are challenged.⁴⁹ Lebow criticizes the United States for being preoccupied with its image and devoting “too much attention to trying to ensure the credibility of its commitments and not enough to ascertaining what *conditions* might prompt challenges to them.”⁵⁰ The image problem is further confounded by the need to reassure allies. Due to the distance between the United States and its allies, it is more difficult to render convincing commitments. Additionally, in the past the United States often perceived itself as “too far away to have to be bothered,” which presents a credibility issue.⁵¹ It is the lack of considering religious challenges in Israel, an area that may seem too far away, that puts the U.S. policymakers at a disadvantage in diplomacy.

Traditional deterrence theory takes *challenges* for granted, but Jervis believes this assumption of rationality should be carefully examined by analyzing how circumstances can cause leaders to perceive others as a threat to their security. Leaders consider others’ intentions and judge them as a threat when witnessing a willingness to ignore accepted procedure, disregarding normal legitimate rights of others, and high acceptance of risks in order to improve position.⁵² Underlying the worries about appearing consistent, assuring friends, and considering threat, is a deeper doubt about ourselves. This psychological insecurity is projected onto others.⁵³ One can infer that Hamas may perceive U.S. image self-preservation efforts as a threat.

⁴⁸Patrick M. Morgan, “Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence,” in *Psychology and Deterrence*, 125–136.

⁴⁹Morgan, “Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence,” 125–136.

⁵⁰Richard Ned Lebow, “*Between Peace and War: the Nature of International Crisis*,” in *Psychology and Deterrence*, 127.

⁵¹Morgan, “Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence,” 151.

⁵²Jervis, “*Perceiving and Coping with Threat*,” 14–15.

⁵³Morgan, “Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence,” 151.

Consistently failing to address religious interests also has negative psychological and physiological effects. Research has demonstrated that our brains react negatively to inconsistencies.⁵⁴ We are neurologically wired to expect certain outcomes. When what we expect does not happen, dopamine levels decrease; when expectations are met, dopamine (or a related chemical) increases. Increased dopamine elevates the brain's perceptions about what feels good.⁵⁵ "We're extremely attuned to the veracity, predictability, group spirit and motivations of those around us."⁵⁶ This is related to the survival flight or fight response in order to quickly judge friend or foe. Our predictions are usually based on our perceptions of previous activity and future expectations of behavior. "If we have a sense that there is a mismatch between our prediction and their actions, that is something that sets off neural alarm bells. And if we think they have been inconsistent about something fundamental . . . we will *feel betrayed*. When we feel deeply betrayed, either by a leader, or by someone in our social circle, or by our beloved, that pain really is similar to *physical pain*."⁵⁷ In short, *unmet expectations feel like pain*.

Additionally, our *judgments* regarding inconsistencies are clouded by our social allegiances. For example, Barden conducted a study measuring hypocrisy along political Republican and Democratic lines. Subjects were told that a drunk driver later spoke out against drunk driving. If the drunk driver was from the same political party, 16% said the driver was a hypocrite for speaking out against drunk driving. However, if the drunk driver was from the opposing political party, then 40% of the subjects stated that the outspoken driver was a hypocrite. Further, people can perceive this inconsistency in others, but are *biased* against noticing it within themselves.⁵⁸ We are in a sense hard wired to detect inconsistency. In similar research, Nabi tested for the effects of emotions,

⁵⁴David Linden in Hong, "Inconsistency: The Real Hobgoblin."

⁵⁵"Dopamine: A Sample Neurotransmitter" <http://www.utexas.edu/research/asrec/dopamine.html>
Note: Dopamine plays a major role in the brain system that is responsible for reward-driven learning. Every type of reward that has been studied increases the level of dopamine transmission in the brain, and a variety of highly addictive drugs, including stimulants such as cocaine and methamphetamine, act directly on the dopamine system.

⁵⁶Linden in Hong, "Inconsistency: The Real Hobgoblin."

⁵⁷*Ibid.*

⁵⁸Jamie Barden in Hong, "Inconsistency: The Real Hobgoblin." Note: this is also known as attribution bias.

particularly anger and fear, in forming frames. By her definition, a frame, “is a perspective infused into a message that promotes the salience of selected pieces of information over others.”⁵⁹ Nabi concluded that “emotions serve as frames for issues, privileging certain information in terms of accessibility and thus guiding subsequent decision making . . . fear and anger can affect information accessibility, desired information seeking, and policy preferences.”⁶⁰ Emotion could preclude analysis of facts.

Now, let us examine how inconsistency leads to violence in Israel where *mutual independence* is not a shared goal. “Where an integrated system exists [Israel], one or more groups [Hamas] are bound to be *unhappy* with that status quo. In some cases, the unsatisfied group . . . is of a different religious tradition [Muslim] than the privileged actor [Jew]. Because integration privileges individual actors and groups, it undermines democracy . . . and it leads to *violence*.”⁶¹ Toft, Philpott and Shah argue, “When the doctrines of a religious actor prescribe a close integration between itself and the state, that the religious actor is prone to *violence* ... Today, the majority of terrorism in the world today is inspired by an Islamic doctrine that prescribes tight integration between religion and state.”⁶² According to Bruce Hoffman, “Religious terrorists regard such violence not only as morally justified but as a necessary expedient for the attainment of

⁵⁹Robin L Nabi, “Exploring the Framing Effects of Emotion: Do Discrete Emotions Differentially Influence Information Accessibility, Information Seeking, and Policy Preference?” *Communication Research* 30, no. 224 (2003), 225; Note: Snow et al. in “Frame Alignment Processes” referred to frame as “schemata of interpretation,” 464.

⁶⁰Robin L Nabi, “Exploring the Framing Effects of Emotion,” 224, 239–242.

⁶¹Toft, Philpott, and Shah, *God’s Century*, 124–125.

⁶²Toft, Philpott, and Shah, *God’s Century*, 125. NOTE: Hamas is employs Jihad for the state. Reuven Paz, “Salafi-Jihadi Responses to Hamas’ Electoral Victory” Hudson Institute. Current Trends in Islamist Ideology. 01 November 2006, accessed 10 October 2012, <http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/salafi-jihadi-responses-to-hamas-electoral-victory>, Note: Hamas has made efforts to crackdown on Pro-AQ groups. In 2009 Hamas killed 24 members of a Salafist jihadi group and its leader, Abu Nour al-Maqdisi, after he proclaimed an “Islamic State of Gaza.”Salafi Jihadism is rising in Gaza. Pro-jihadi groups are more anti-Hamas than pro-AQ. Hamas charter calls for *destruction* of Israel. Khaled Mishal put in a joint document, signed with the PLO in 2011, which agreed to peace, not give *legitimacy*, but willing to live with hudna, from Glenn E. Robinson, DA 3120 Jihadi Information Operations course, 10 November 2011.

their goals.”⁶³ Toft, Philpott and Shah clarify, “religious terrorism that exists today rarely involves religion alone; social, political, economic, and environmental factors are often in play as well.”⁶⁴ Perhaps Hamas’s unmet expectations will feel like physical pain until they achieve their objectives, thus encouraging *violence*.

Now, consider how the United States has set expectations over time. The political policy efforts of President Carter in 1979 can illuminate the issues with negotiating a peace policy in the Middle East when failing to consider religion. Through cultural analysis, Carter should have known the religious intentions of Israel’s neighbors and perhaps could have fashioned a better peace agreement. On the one hand, Egypt’s Begin and Israel’s Sadat were awarded the Nobel Peace prize after negotiating with President Carter for a return of the Sinai to Egypt, gradual Israeli military withdrawal of the West Bank and Gaza, Israel providing security and public order, the creation of an autonomous Palestinian group with only a *temporary* presence in Israel. Carter viewed the Israeli-Egyptian agreement as a precursor to a host of follow-on accords with all of Israel’s local enemies. On a religious level, however, the agreement was disastrous for relationships between Middle East countries. Because Egypt became seen as an outcast by its Arab neighbors, it lost Saudi subsidies and became dependent on U.S. aid for support.⁶⁵ Arabs became “divided into hostile and the very hostile.”⁶⁶ Israel began its battle against the PLO and Yasser Arafat over control of the land in the West Bank and Gaza.

Israel responded to the difficult negotiations with the PLO by initially encouraging Hamas. The Israeli government encouraged Hamas’s emergence in order for it to combat the PLO by proxy.⁶⁷ But Israel failed to account for Hamas’s religious

⁶³Bruce Hoffman, “‘Holy Terror’: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative.” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 18, no.4 (1995): 271–284 in Toft, Philpott and Shah’s, *God’s Century*, 125. Note: For Hoffman, religious terrorism has to be based in sacred text. Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 85. “Since 1968, religious terrorism has risen and become more global” Toft, Philpott and Shah, *God’s Century*, 127.

⁶⁴Toft, Philpott and Shah, *God’s Century*, 127–129.

⁶⁵Peter Calvocoressi, “From the Suez to Camp David” *World Politics Since 1945* (New York: Longman Inc, 1982), 198–199, 240–241.

⁶⁶Peter Calvocoressi, “From the Suez to Camp David,” 241. Note: Carter did not maintain office long enough to facilitate the agreement.

⁶⁷Robinson, “Hamas as Social Movement,” 119, 123.

beliefs, thinking its security would be enhanced by allowing Hamas more room to grow than the PLO.⁶⁸ But Israel supported Hamas without considering the long term consequences.⁶⁹ Combined, the Palestinians were presented with policy inconsistencies by Israeli and U.S. policy, paving the way toward “Islam is the solution.”⁷⁰

The 1993 Oslo Accord did not yield positive relationships nor security results between Israel and the PLO (and emerging Hamas), but demonstrated an inconsistency. “Oslo established a Palestinian government with some territorial control in the West Bank and Gaza, thus creating a new reality to which Hamas [in competition with the PLO] needed to respond.”⁷¹ However, Israel did not fully end its presence in the West Bank and Gaza, and Palestinians perceived a failure in achieving rights to self govern, suffering *unmet expectations*.⁷² The inconsistency between the Oslo agreement and execution gave “Hamas a political home to those disillusioned by Oslo.”⁷³

The U.S. only responded to Hamas’s perceived inability to effectively govern the Palestinian violence against Israel by declaring it a terrorist organization.⁷⁴ In 2006, the U.S. State Department added Hamas to its Foreign Terrorist Organization list, “Various Hamas elements have used both violent and political means, including terrorism, to

⁶⁸Muhammad Nazal, in Robinson, “Hamas as Social Movement,” 124.

⁶⁹Muhammad Nazal, in Robinson, “Hamas as Social Movement,” 124.

⁷⁰Ahmed Yassin, interview with Miriam Shahin, “Sheikh Yassin Speaks Out,” *The Middle East*, December 2001, 11; Glenn E. Robinson, “Hamas as Social Movement,” 130131. Note: Hamas frequently messages “Islam is the solution” (*al-Islam, huwa al-hall*). Similarly, Gush Emunim claims *Malchut Yisrael* is the restoration of the authority of the house of King David over the whole land of Israel; The U.S. is diplomatically supporting Israel, and receives significant criticism for its Israel policy.

⁷¹Robinson, “Hamas as Social Movement,” 125.

⁷²*Ibid.*, 125–126.

⁷³*Ibid.*, 126.

⁷⁴Note: The 1998 Hamas charter declared that one of its aims is to destroy Israel. Hamas officially formed in late 1987 as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, unofficially in 1986, when seven men met in Hebron. U.S.State Department, Foreign Terrorist Organization List, 2006, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/45323.pdf> .; “Salafi-Jihadi Responses to Hamas’ Electoral Victory” accessed 11 September 2012, <http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/salafi-jihadi-responses-to-hamas-electoral-victory>.

pursue the goal of establishing an Islamic Palestinian state in Israel.”^{75, 76} Or again, “U.S. policy makers have stated that foreign aid cannot resume until Hamas, a U.S. State Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), renounces, among other things, its commitment to the destruction of the state of Israel and the use of terrorist violence.”⁷⁷ Walsh describes one of the “U.S.’s top foreign policy priorities is countering Islamic terrorism.”⁷⁸ But in 2009, during U.S. economic stimulus negotiations, the United States considered sending Hamas economic aid during the blockade of Gaza.⁷⁹ Supporting an entity that is also labeled as an FTO is an *inconsistency*.

Hamas perceives U.S. policy as anti-Palestinian Muslim. In 2001, Sheikh Yassin rejected the U.S. war on terrorism policy claiming “Muslims of Palestine are targeted. Everything that has happened to date shows that the targets are the Arabs and the Muslims. It is a war against us all.”⁸⁰ Similarly, one can infer that perceptions of U.S.

⁷⁵Title 22 of the U.S. Code, Section 2656f, which requires the Department of State to provide an annual report to Congress on terrorism, requires the report to include, inter alia, information on terrorist groups and umbrella groups under which any terrorist group falls . . . groups known to be financed by state sponsors of terrorism about which Congress was notified during the past year in accordance with Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act; Note: “Hamas is loosely structured, with some elements working clandestinely and others operating openly through mosques and social service institutions to recruit members, raise money, organize activities, and distribute propaganda. Hamas’ strength is concentrated in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.”

⁷⁶U.S. State Department, Foreign Terrorist Organization List, 2006, accessed 11 September 2012, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/45323.pdf>. Note: Hamas terrorists, especially those in the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, have conducted many attacks, including large-scale suicide bombings, against Israeli civilian and military targets. Hamas maintained the pace of its operational activity in 2004, claiming numerous attacks against Israeli interests. Hamas has not yet directly targeted U.S. interests, although the group makes little or no effort to avoid targets frequented by foreigners.

⁷⁷U.S. State Department CRS Report to Congress. U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, 27 June 2007, accessed 03 June 2012, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/68794.pdf>. “Since the formation of a Hamas-led Palestinian Authority government in March 2006, the U.S. Administration has suspended its foreign assistance program in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.” Note: Robinson argues that, “the official U.S. position is problematic . . . by labeling Hamas a terrorist group, the government ignores most of what Hamas actually does.” “Hamas as Social Movement,” 112.

⁷⁸James Igoe Walsh, “Intelligence Sharing and U.S. Counterterrorism Policy,” *The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 110. Note: In 2009, Hamas was considered as part of the U.S. economic stimulus package. CNN, Political Ticker Blog. “Obama Calls for Rethinking Gaza Blockade, Announces Aid Package.”; Phillips, “Obama Says Economic”

⁷⁹CNN, Political Ticker Blog. Obama Calls for Rethinking Gaza Blockade, Announces Aid Package. 09 June 2010, accessed 11 September 2012, <http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/06/09/obama-calls-for-rethinking-gaza-blockade-announces-aid-package/>.

⁸⁰Miriam Shahin, “Sheikh Yassin Speaks Out,” *The Middle East* (2001): 11. Note: Yassin is one of the seven founding members of Hamas in Hebron (formally in 1986) and Hamas’s chief ideologue. In 1983, the movement convened in an unnamed Arab state, and established operational groups.

policy have increased the intensity of the violence from a statement made by dismissed Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh who denounced the operation against Osama bin Laden. “If the reports that are coming in concerning the death of bin Laden are correct, we say that this is a continuation of the American *policy* of killing and violence. We denounce the assassination of a Muslim Jihad fighter and an Arab man.”⁸¹

The current U.S. *policy* narrative fails both to maintain consistency and provide the reasons for a special relationship status with democratically elected Israeli diplomats.⁸² In 2012, President Obama had been under pressure from Republican rivals, and even some Democratic allies, over his backing of Israel. On March 5, he reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to Israeli security. “The United States will always have Israel’s back when it comes to Israel’s security.” Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu insisted Americans know Israel is their only reliable democratic ally in the Mideast and claimed that “Israel and America stand together.”⁸³ Standing together, “having Israel’s back,” is a different approach than the one President Obama embraced on May 19, 2011, where he called for Israel to return to the pre-1967 land boundary, which in turn was also *inconsistent* with the “roadmap” laid out in 2003 for negotiating a lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians.⁸⁴ This roadmap required Palestinians to abandon *violence* against Israel and implement democratic reforms and demanded that Israel halt expanding settlements and recognize and support a reformed Palestinian Authority (now Hamas). In return for the resumption of peace talks, Israel insisted Palestinians

⁸¹“Hamas MP: Bin Laden Killing is ‘A Continuation of the American Policy of Killing and Violence’” 02 May 2012, accessed 11 September 2012, http://www.palwatch.org/pages/news_archive.aspx?doc_id=5408. Note: Member of Parliament (the Palestinian Legislative Council) Ismail Al-Ashqar, representing the Party for Change and Reform [Hamas] said, “The murder of Osama bin Laden is state terrorism which the U.S. is applying against Muslims. [The U.S.] could have arrested him and given him a fair trial, but it has harmed itself, and through this crime it is provoking Islam and Muslims.”

⁸²U.S. EUCOM, Israel site, accessed 23 January 2012, <http://www.eucom.mil/mission/the-region/israel>. Note: The policy executor U.S. EUCOM lists on its site, “Commitment to Israel’s security and well being has been a cornerstone of U.S. policy in the Middle East since Israel’s founding in 1948, in which the United States played a key supporting role.”

⁸³Alan Greenblatt, “Obama’s Speech Leaves ‘Disappointment’ Abroad” National Public Radio, 19 May 2011, accessed 06 Mar 2011, <http://www.npr.org/2011/05/24/136470535/obamas-speech-leaves-disappointment-abroad?ft=1&f=1001>; Note: Netanyahu also pointed out that in Iran’s narrative, “For them, you’re [the U.S.] the Great Satan, and we’re the Little Satan.” ...

⁸⁴Greenblatt, “Obama’s Speech Leaves ‘Disappointment’ Abroad.”

acknowledge Israel as a Jewish state, have no standing Army, allow Israeli military presence in the West Bank, and not control airspace or water.⁸⁵ U.S. policy makers' failure to articulate a comprehensive strategic narrative to competitors for the land of Israel has resulted in a decline of world opinion of U.S. regional policy and opened space for a jihadi narrative.⁸⁶ In other words, U.S. policy has failed to both consider the religious aspects and maintain a consistent approach toward Hamas.

Given the arguments about political inconsistencies and their effects on expectations, politicians should maintain a general blanket policy regarding a relationship with particular countries, based upon diplomatic, economic and military cooperation interests, while also including the religious considerations. However, the recognition of Israel's sovereignty while maintaining the flexibility to assert influence regarding a nation's subordinate entities and independent actors that run counter to the interests. This seems to be a good method to avoid political inconsistency, while more importantly, maintaining the ability to collect valid and necessary intelligence to drive further policy formulation and aims. Initially, we should be very careful about making policy statements and messages since this creates *expectations*, and unmet expectations can lead to increased uncertainty and negative cognitive and physical reactions. The evidence shows that Israel is still the only stable democracy in the area. Naturally, an inconsistent approach toward a terrorist group raises more questions. Has the U.S. policy reacted too slowly to miss the heart of the issue that perhaps we have chosen the wrong enemy? Instead of the battleground being about land, could it be for the heart of humankind? Robert R. Reilly argues that advancing moral legitimacy is the battleground for the war of ideas.⁸⁷ A coherent diplomatic apparatus that considers *political theology* must be in

⁸⁵Lourdes Garcia-Navarro, "Israel's Netanyahu To Deliver Major Mideast Speech," National Public Radio, 12 June 2009, accessed 05 Mar 2012, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105339925>.

⁸⁶Esposito and Mogahed, *Who Speaks for Islam?*, 159–160.

⁸⁷Robert Reilly, Naval Postgraduate School discussion, 02 Nov 2012. Perhaps former Israeli President Peres's words about not allowing words to negatively influence the *heart* of the people is essential to progress. He did not allow threats to influence the heart of the movement. "The better they have it, the better we consider it for all of us." Shimon Peres, Interview with Bret Baier, 12 June 2012, Accessed 14 June 2012, www.foxnews.com/on-air/special-report-baier/videos#p/86927/v/1686273731001.

place to detect emerging threats to democracy and U.S. policy and provide a coherent strategic narrative.⁸⁸

B. GUSH EMUNIM'S POLITICAL THEOLOGY

Understanding the Jewish Israeli objections to a two-state final settlement agreement in Israel is difficult. Religious Jews fervently seek to control the land, particularly Jerusalem, and maintain sovereign rule according to their religious principles. However, there is a nuanced difference between the two groups regarding a land and peace settlement. The information contained in this chapter regarding Gush Emunim's and Hamas's religious considerations has been formerly omitted, misunderstood, or disregarded in political discussions. Comparing religious frameworks allows for recommendations on a potential way ahead toward peaceful relations. In the current Gush Emunim framework, there is absolutely no room for permanent compromise on land based on inheritance, covenants, redemption, and the Jewish temple.

C. GUSH EMUNIM-THE INTENT FOR THE LAND

Members of Gush Emunim believe that Judaism is the highest form of worship and ideals for governing a population.⁸⁹ The identity of the nation, in Gush Emunim's belief, is shaped by the enduring promise of the land by God to Abraham and his descendants. Gush Emunim leaders believe their presence in disputed areas such as the West Bank, Gaza, and all of Israel is sanctified by God who promised Abraham that his descendants would inherit the land forever.⁹⁰ Gush Emunim does not want to relinquish any of the land and desires to rule in accordance with the Torah.⁹¹

⁸⁸Linda Wertheimer and Steve Inskeep, "Congress' Benghazi Probe Could Send Wrong Message" 15 November 2012, accessed 15 November 2012, <http://www.npr.org/2012/11/15/165186976/we-didnt-know-how-well-al-qaida-was-organized-in-libya>; Albright, "Ignore Religion 'At Our Own Peril.'"

⁸⁹Eliezer Siegel, "Radical Messianic Zionism," accessed 26 June 2012, <http://www.ucalgary.ca/~elsegal/index.html>.

⁹⁰Roy Lewicki et al., *Essentials of Negotiation*, 36. Note: Psalm 137:56 "If I forget you, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget its skill! If I do not remember you, let my tongue cling to the roof of my mouth If I do not exalt Jerusalem above my chief joy."

⁹¹Yoel Ben-Nun, in Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), 108. Note: Rabbi Yoel Ben-Nun was a student of Zvi Yehuda Kook, one of the most influential graduates of Merkaz, and claimed to present the Kook's authentic message.

The land is critical to Gush Emunim, whose aims are influenced heavily by Rav Kook,^{92, 93} who declared the immutable relation of the Torah, conquest, and settlement:

We are commanded to possess and to settle. The meaning of possession is conquest, and in performing this mitzvah, we can perform the other—the commandment to settle. In our eternal Torah we are commanded to settle the desolate land, meaning the portions of the land that are spiritually desolate. We cannot evade this commandment . . . Torah, war and settlement—they are three things in one and we rejoice in the authority we have been given for each of them.^{94, 95, 96}

Kook based his beliefs on the Jewish narratives in Genesis, in which God promises the land to Abraham and his descendants forever:

God said to Abram, “Go for yourself from your land . . . to the land that I will show you. And I will make of you a great nation; I will bless you, and make your name great, and you shall be a blessing. I will bless those who

⁹²Zvi Yehuda Kook, “Honest We Shall Be: In the Land and in the Torah” in Sprinzak, “Fundamentalism, Terrorism, and Democracy.” Note: Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak ha-Cohen Kook, in his influential 1920s and 1930s writings, never advocated political fundamentalism or “operative messianism,” but rather supported the secular Zionist movement, one of slow and prudent progress towards an independent state. However, Israel’s victory in the 1967 Six-Day War transformed religious Jews’ *practice* of redemption. Kook’s son, Rav Zvi Yehuda, defined Israel as the kingdom of heaven on earth. The government was expected to govern according to Maimonides’ “rules of kings” and Torah prescriptions.

⁹³*Jewish Virtual Library*, Accessed 29 June 2012, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsourc/biography/Maimonides.html>; Note: Maimonides (Moses ben Maimon 1135–1204 CE), regarded as the greatest figure in Jewish history since Moses who delivered the 10 commandments. The spiritual development of Judaism through him as codifier, judge and commenatator is renowned. Mishneh Torah is the first systematic exposition of Jewish religion from Dagobert Runes, *Dictionary of Judaism*, 160. Maimonides, Moses ben Maimon, was a 12th century Jewish sage who wrote the Mishnah Torah, a systematic code of Jewish law prescribing the proper way to practice the Jewish faith

⁹⁴Zvi Yehuda Kook, “Between the People and Its Land,” in Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord*, 106.

⁹⁵Note: The command (mitzvah) to settle is a commandment in the Torah, “That you may live and go in and possess the land which the Lord, the God of your fathers, giveth you.” Deuteronomy 4:1, in “The Centrality of Eretz Yisrael” *Eyal Project: Mitzvat Yishuv HaAretz*, accessed 18 January 2012, <http://eretz-yisrael.com/apage/6015.php>.

⁹⁶Yoel Ben-Nun, in Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord*, 108. Rabbi Yoel Ben-Nun, who claims to be transmitting the authentic message of the Kooks, comments on the difficulty in settling the land (Eretz Yisrael), “We shall not forget ‘our Transjordan’ but we know well that the people of Israel, in its current circumstances . . . is hardly able to integrate the western Land of Israel . . . but ‘This is also the word of God.’”; Note: in approximately 2,064 B.C. God (Hashem) made a covenant with Abram included in Genesis 15:18–21 “to your descendants I have given this land, *from the river of Egypt to the great river, the River Euphrates*—the Kenites, the Kenezites, the Kadmonites, the Hittites, the Perizzites, the Rephaim, the Amorites, the Canaanites, the Girgashites, and the Jebusites.”

bless you, and him who curses you I will curse; and *all* the families of the earth shall bless themselves by you.”⁹⁷

The significance of the land to the Jewish identity is discussed by prominent influential figures. Rabbi Shlomo Aviner declares, “there is an absolute Torah prohibition against the transfer of any portion of our holy land to foreign rule,” and anyone who discusses giving up the West Bank or Gaza is “profaning the name of God.”⁹⁸ Rabbi Meir ben Baruch also emphasized the importance of the land. “Our sages teach that every Jew possesses a portion of Eretz Yisrael, the land of Israel. The converse is also true. The land possesses a portion of every Jew.”⁹⁹ The land of Israel is “equal in weight to all the (ten) commandments put together,” and the commandments are tied to and dependent on the land of Israel.¹⁰⁰

According to custom, the firstborn son was the heir to the father’s inheritance.¹⁰¹ The divergence between Jews and Muslim begins here.

[Sarah said to Abraham], Cast out this bondwoman [Hagar] and her son [Ishmael]; for the son of this bondwoman shall not be heir with my son, namely with Isaac.” God said to Abraham, “Whatever Sarah has said to you, listen to her voice; for in Isaac your seed shall be called. Yet I will also make a nation of the son of the bondwoman, because he is your seed.”¹⁰²

How the Gush Emunim understand God’s deliverance of the Jews from slavery to the land informs their objection to a two-state approach. Rabbi Shlomo Aviner proclaimed, “We have been commanded by the God of Israel and the creator of the world to take possession of this entire land, in its holy borders, and to do this by wars of

⁹⁷*Genesis 12:1–3*. Note: Text reads *Hashem* as a name for *God*. Abram’s name changed to Abraham.

⁹⁸Shlomo Aviner, “Dialogues between Shaltiel and the Sage,” *Artzi* 1 (1982): 32. Note: Aviner was a student of Zvi Yehuda Kook and claims to be transmitting the Kooks’ messages.

⁹⁹Rabbeinu Meir ben Baruch, Responsum 536 (in *Otzar HaGeonim on Tractate Kiddushin*, sec. 146) in “Eyes Upon the Land: Preface to the Second Edition,” *Chabad-Lubavitch Sichos in English*. Note: Baruch was an influential 13th century Talmudist.

¹⁰⁰Aryeh Newman, “The Centrality of Eretz Yisrael in Nachmanides,” *Tradition* 10, no. 1 (1968): 21–30. Note: Newman is a Jewish scholar, professor and author.

¹⁰¹A. Cohen, *Everyman’s Talmud* (New York, NY: Schocken Books, 1975), 343.

¹⁰²*Genesis 21:8–13*. Note: Muslims claim Ishmael is the son of promise.

defense, and even by wars of liberation.”¹⁰³ Yedidiya Segal clarified, “In Eretz Yisrael either the Arabs or the Jews can live, and not the two of them together.”^{104,105} And Rabbi Moshe Levinger believes the borders of the land should accord with the book of Deuteronomy.¹⁰⁶ This excerpt from Deuteronomy discusses the relationship between early Jews and the inhabitants of the land:

When the Lord your God delivers them [Canaanite kingdoms] over to you, you shall conquer them and utterly destroy them. You shall make no covenant with them . . . for they will turn your sons away from following Me, to serve other gods; so the anger of the Lord will be aroused against you and destroy you suddenly . . . because He would keep the oath which He [God] swore to your fathers.¹⁰⁷

Israel Eldad similarly wrote, “We are re-living the days of Joseph, Moses, Joshua and David, all at once.”¹⁰⁸

Gush Emunim draws a connection between the early 1405 BCE conquest of Canaan by the early Jews and modern conflict.¹⁰⁹ Moshe Gil observed, “The sizable

¹⁰³Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, in Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord*, 106.

¹⁰⁴Yedidiya Segal, “Neither Arabic or Arabs,” in Ehud Spinzak, *The Ascendance of Israel’s Radical Right* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 12.

¹⁰⁵“Chancellor’s Parashah Commentary: Parashat Hayyei Sarah-Genesis 23:1–25:18,” The Jewish Theological Seminary, 09 November 1996, accessed 20 June 2012, <http://test.jtsa.edu/prebuilt/parashaharchives/5757/hayyeisharah.shtml>. Note: Per God’s instructions, Abraham bound Isaac as an act of obedience to God, and therefore established himself righteous. God’s response to Abraham regarding a sign for his inheritance is, “Bring Me a three-year-old heifer, a three-year-old she-goat, a three-year-old ram, a turtledove, and a young bird” Genesis 15:9. After the birth of her own son, Isaac, Sarah forced Abraham to expel Hagar and Ishmael from the household. Genesis 21:9–21. Note: According to Dr. Ismar Schorsch, Chancellor of The Jewish Theological Seminary, in Gush Emunim’s view, the binding of Isaac by Abraham and the sign by God to Abraham is proof of the inheritance.

¹⁰⁶Ian Jack, “Hebron is a Ghost Town where Joggers Carry Automatic Rifles,” *The Guardian*, 17 May 2008, accessed 14 May 2012, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/may/17/israelandthepalestinians>; Note: In *Genesis* 22:2, Hebron (Kiriath-arba) is the city where Abraham’s wife Sarah passed away; Rabbi Levinger helped establish Gush Emunin and is an original Jewish settler in Hebron. In Deuteronomy, the land extended from the Mediterranean Sea to the Euphrates River (modern Iraq).

¹⁰⁷*Deuteronomy* 7:2–4, 7–8.

¹⁰⁸Israel Eldad, *The Jewish Revolution: Jewish Statehood* (Jerusalem, Israel: Gefen Publishing House, 2007), 55–56. Note: Eldad is a secular Zionist originally active in the Revisionist movement.

¹⁰⁹*Joshua* 1:1–12; *Deuteronomy* 7:2–8; *Kehot Publication Society*. “Our People: A History of the Jews,” Merkos L’Inyonei Chinuch, 2009, accessed 09 April 2012, http://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/463949/jewish/Joshua.htm; Radmacher, *The Nelson Study Bible*, 227.

Jewish population in Palestine at the dawn of the Arab Muslim conquest were ‘the direct descendants of the generations of Jews who had lived there since the days of Joshua bin Nun, in other words for some 2,000 years.’¹¹⁰ Joshua was obedient, in part, to the call for the land. He utterly destroyed the armies of Sihon and Og, but disobeyed the call toward the Philistines and Amelekites, among others. “Religiously driven proponents . . . point to the verse, “The Lord will be at war with Amalek throughout the ages of Israel’s military campaign sometimes,” (Exodus 17:16), interpreting it to mean that there is a state of permanent war mandated by God against those who are defined as the descendents of Amalek, in this case the Palestinians.”¹¹¹ Rabbi Ariel encouraged fighting, “let every individual abandon a house and *do battle* in Yamit in order to save Judea and Samaria, in order to save all of the Land of Israel!”¹¹²

Jewish scholars illuminate the problem with this interpretation; these passages [about Amelekites] are used “by some to legitimate violence against some Palestinians.”¹¹³ Etzion declared: “The expurgation (expulsion) of the Temple Mount will prepare the hearts for the understanding and further advancing of our full redemption.”¹¹⁴ In ancient times, an expulsion law existed which was interpreted to give authority to exterminate the seven nations of Canaan. The combination of Joshua’s conquest of Canaan, fears of cultural bleed-over, and the commands of Exodus 23:20–33,

¹¹⁰Andrew G. Bostom, “Negating the Legacy of Jihad in Palestine,” *Israel Affairs* 13, no. 4 (October 2007): 823. Note: Gill is a Jewish history professor at Tel Aviv University and Rothschild Prize for Judaic Studies winner, in *A History of Palestine: 634–1099*.

¹¹¹Thistlethwaite and Stassen, “Abrahamic Alternatives to War: Jewish, Christian, and Muslim Perspectives on Just Peacemaking,” *United States Institute of Peace* Special Report 214 (2008): 2. Note: scholars from a variety of religious traditions at the U.S. Institute of Peace collaborated.

¹¹²Yisrael Ariel, in Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother*, Note: Rabbi Ariel is a vanguardist (ideological spokesman for active redemption “practical messianism”) for Gush Emunim and claims to be transmitting the Kook’s messages, and had been arrested for urging two soldiers at Yamit to disobey orders, 113–114.

¹¹³Thistlethwaite and Stassen, “Abrahamic Alternatives to War,” 2. Note: Especially against those who advocate, as does Hamas, the destruction of Israel.

¹¹⁴Ehud Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother*, 164; Etzion also said, “David’s property in the Temple Mount is therefore a real and eternal property in the name of all Israel . . . No legality or ownership claim which is not made in the name of Israel and for the need of rebuilding the temple, is valid,” 164.

continues to fuel modern violence.¹¹⁵ Today, expulsion is interpreted as total Jewish domination of the land of Israel. If Jewish authority is acknowledged, the Palestinian people are given resident alien status, *Ger Toshav*, including civic rights.¹¹⁶

D. GUSH EMUNIM-AN EVERLASTING COVENANT

The Gush Emunim claims that Israel is moving toward fulfilling the Torah's covenants, and the people will be judged by Torah prescriptions.¹¹⁷ Yehuda Etzion contends that the covenants leave no room for Muslim involvement:

The proper kingdom of Israel that we have to establish here between the two rivers (the Euphrates and the Nile). This kingdom will be directed by the Supreme Court which is bound to sit on the place chosen by God to emit his inspiration to a site which will have a temple, an altar, and a king chosen by God. All the people of Israel will inherit the land to labor and to keep.¹¹⁸

To Gush Emunim, the portions of the Tanakh describing Abraham, Moses, David and Joshua all conclude that the Jews must be obedient to God's covenant to possess the land.¹¹⁹ The Davidic covenant claims that David "shall build a house for My [God's] name, and I will establish the throne of his *kingdom forever*. I will be his Father, and he shall be My son. If he commits iniquity, I will *chasten* him . . . but my *mercy* shall not

¹¹⁵Thistlethwaite and Stassen. "Abrahamic Alternatives to War," 3; Note: Exodus 22:19 "one who brings offerings to the gods shall be destroyed-only to God alone!" Exodus 23:20-33 "For My angel shall go before you and bring you to the Amorite, the Hittite, the Perizzite, the Canaanite, the Hivvite, and the Jebusite, and I will annihilate them . . . you shall smash their pillars."

¹¹⁶Ehud Sprinzak, *The Ascendancy of Israel's Radical Right* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 122. Note: This leads to the famous "three alternatives" for non-Jews in the land. One is to acknowledge Zionist doctrine and receive full civic rights. A second is to obey the laws of the state without recognizing Zionism and receive resident alien, but no voting, rights. A third is to leave Israel with economic incentives.

¹¹⁷Rav Zvi Yehuda Kook, "Honest We Shall Be: In the Land and in the Torah" (Hebrew), in Y. Shaviv, *A Land of Settlement* (Jerusalem: 1977), 106-110.

¹¹⁸Yehuda Etzion, "From the Flag of Jerusalem to the Redemption Movement" (Hebrew), *Nequda* 94, 20 December 1985, 22. Note: Etzion was an ideological spokesman for a prominent segment of the Underground of Gush Emunim. Etzion notes Rav Kook inspired him to realize his responsibility, "The commandment that pounded in the heart of Joshua and the generation who captured Canaan, in the heart of David and Solomon, and their generation, the word of God in his Torah, is thus, as it was first purely stated, what motivates us." Ian Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord*, 98.

¹¹⁹Etzion, "From the Flag of Jerusalem to the Redemption Movement," 22.

depart from him.”¹²⁰ The covenant is emphasized by Rav Avraham Kook, quoting scripture, “Recall me, God, when you desire your nation, visit me with Your salvation . . . to rejoice in the *joy of your nation*, to take pride in *Your inheritance*.”¹²¹ Similarly, Israel Eldad contends that most religious Jews think of Israel’s contemporary role in re-establishing the kingdom of Israel is a “process of redemption that will culminate in the establishment of *Malchut Yisrael*.”¹²² Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, student of Zvi Kook, encourages, “‘Do not abandon the land to any other nation.’ If possible by peaceful means, wonderful, and if not, we are commanded to make war to accomplish it.”¹²³ Figure 2 depicts the extent of Eretz Yisrael during King David’s reign.




Figure 2. Israel Map Estimated 969 BC
From: Radmacher, “The Davidic Kingdom,” 553.

¹²⁰Samuel 7:12–17.

¹²¹Rav Avraham Yitzchak Kook, translated by Yaacov Shulman “The Source of Delight” *Orot Hakodesh* III, 187, accessed 03 April 2012, <http://ravkook.net/land-of-Israel.html>. Note: *Psalm 106:4–5*.

¹²²Israel Eldad, in Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord*, 110; Note: *Malchut Yisrael* is the restoration of the authority of the house of King David over the whole Land of Israel.

¹²³Shlomo Aviner, in Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord*, 95.

E. GUSH EMUNIM-THROUGH STRUGGLE TO REDEMPTION

Gush Emunim believe that God's promises will culminate in the ultimate victory of the twelve tribes of Israel over their enemies. Zionists point to scriptures, such as Isaiah 29:1–24, claiming necessary struggle and violence will fulfill prophecy and usher in the messianic era.¹²⁴ This redemption can only happen in the context of greater Eretz Yisrael, and departing from Jewish lands or settlements is seen as forfeiting God's divine redemption. The initial Gush Emunim platform reflects this goal. "To bring about a major spiritual reawakening in the Jewish people for the sake of the full realization of the Zionist vision . . . the total redemption of both the Jewish people and the whole world."¹²⁵ Rabbi Eleazar Waldman stated, "We (tell the truth) out of our responsibility to the gentiles. Based on our faith that 'You have chosen us from among all the families of the earth' . . . and be ready to *struggle* on behalf of truth."¹²⁶

Put differently, the Jewish struggle for the land has an end-state, which the Gush Emunim believes will be reached when the Messiah returns and the land is established by God.¹²⁷ "In Jewish law, there is a concept of an owner's giving up his right to his property-including his land. But when a person's land was stolen from him, and he protested and continues to protest, his rights never expire."¹²⁸ This is expounded on by Rabbi Eleazar Waldman, quoting Rav Kook, "When war breaks out, the power of the Messiah is aroused. The time of the nightingale has arrived; she sings in the boughs. The

¹²⁴Thistlethwaite and Stassen, "Abrahamic Alternatives to War," 3; Note: footnote of Rabbi Nosson Scherman. *Tanach: The Stone Edition: The Torah, Prophets, Writings: The Twenty-Four Books of the Bible* (Brooklyn: Mesorah Publications, 2007), 1001–1003 examples and excerpts of Isaiah include: God will wipe away the attackers and they will vanquish; Isaiah reprimands the people for rejecting the word of God and following false prophets; and "Hashem [God], Who redeemed Abraham, to the House of Jacob . . . who will sanctify My Name, they will sanctify the Holy One of Jacob and revere the God of Israel!"

¹²⁵Ed Snitkoff, "My Jewish Learning: Settling All the Land," accessed 14 June 2012, <http://www.myjewishlearning.com>.

¹²⁶Rabbi Eleazar Waldman, in Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord*, 113. Note: Waldman is a prominent Gush Emunim religious figure and former Knesset member, who claimed to transmit the Kook's authentic message

¹²⁷Rabbi Avraham Kook in Rabbi Eleazar Waldman, "The Struggle on the Road to Peace," *Artzi*, vol 3 (1983): 18, 20.

¹²⁸Rav Avraham Yitzchak Kook, translated by Yaacov Shulman "A Divine Right" from *Malachim Kivnei Adam*, 179, accessed 04 July 2012, <http://ravkook.net/land-of-Israel.html>.

wicked ones disappear from the world.”¹²⁹ In the Jewish narrative, warfare has a redeeming quality in re-establishing the land for Jews after a break in peace (normally a consequence of disobedience).

The penalty for past disobedience required repentance and obedience to re-establish the covenant after a brief cleansing period:

I [God] will bring them into the land of their enemies . . . I will remember My *covenant* with Jacob and also My *covenant* with Isaac, and also My *covenant* with Abraham will I remember, and I will remember the *land* . . . and they must gain *appeasement* for their iniquity . . . nor will I have rejected them to obliterate them, to annul My covenant with them—for I am Hashem, their God. ¹³⁰

This is important to note for understanding Gush Emunim’s framing of periods of Israel’s sovereignty and broken statehood over the land since the 1405 BCE.

In reference to redemption, in Jewish custom leaders’ authority is rooted in obedience to the Torah. The Torah’s truth is more important than popularity, and redemption is heralded above all.¹³¹ Similarly, Rabbi Yisrael Ariel exhorts leaders to be obedient to the Torah. “When a king of Israel behaves in a manner contrary to the Torah—his authority as a king of Israel is cancelled . . . similarly we must distinguish between the concept of “state,” that has supreme value, and the concept of “leader of the people.”¹³² If the leader loses focus on Torah principles, he loses *legitimacy* and support.

Authentic adherence to Jewish law is used as justification for ultra-religious nationalistic behavior. In the 1990s, mainstream Rabbis exhorted religious Jews to disobey military commands to evacuate settlements, and referred to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin a traitor to the higher Jewish cause. A follower of these views assassinated

¹²⁹Rav Avraham Kook, in Rabbi Eleazar Waldman, “The Struggle on the Road to Peace,” *Artzi* Vol 3 (1983), 18, 20; Note: Kook references portions of the Song of Songs.

¹³⁰Scherman. *Tanach, The Stone Edition*, 315–317 (emphasis added); *Leviticus* 26:40–46.

¹³¹Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord*, 111, 113, 115.

¹³²Rabbi Yisrael Ariel, “Was There Indeed a Revolt,” in Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord*, 111.

the Prime Minister in 1995.¹³³ Indeed, Gush Emunim originated, in part, because of perceived disobedience to the Torah:

Shortly after President Sadat's visit of Israel . . . the picture of the Dome of the Rock on Temple Mount—to which I shall heretofore refer as the 'abomination.' My friend argued that the existence of the abomination on Temple Mount, our holiest place, was the root cause of all the spiritual errors of our generation and the basis of Ishmael's [i.e., the Arabs'] hold in Eretz Yisrael.¹³⁴

The Muslim Dome of the Rock and Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem are located on a site that Jews claim is the historic Temple built by King David's son Solomon.¹³⁵ Therefore, the Dome of the Rock and Al-Aqsa Mosque are strong visual symbols of the penalty of Jewish disobedience to the Torah prescriptions.

Gush Emunim began labeling violent redemptive actions "practical messianism."¹³⁶ Some contemporaries interpret practical messianism as sanctioning the use of violent means to achieve religious ends. Rabbi Yitzhak Ginzburg describes revenge as "the return of the individual and the nation to believe in themselves, in their power and in the fact that they have a place under the sun and are no longer stepped on by everybody."¹³⁷ The Tractate Sanhedrin decreed, "whoever destroys a Jewish life is considered to have destroyed an entire world. And whoever saves a Jewish life is considered to have saved an entire world."¹³⁸ As such, Jews promote actions that protect Jews and shield against the influence of other religions.

Most redemption proponents emphasize their belief in the decisive human role in fulfilling God's will. Events such as the return of Jews to the land in 1948 and success in

¹³³Eliezer Siegel, "Radical Messianic Zionism," accessed 14 May 2012, <http://www.ucalgary.ca/~elsegal/index.html>.

¹³⁴Menachi Livni, *Interrogation*, 18 May 1984 in Sprinzak, "Fundamentalism, Terrorism, and Democracy."; Note: The underground is a people loyal to Gush Emunim aims but not necessarily formal members of Gush Emunim. Livni was the operational commander of the underground of Gush Emunim.

¹³⁵*Psalm 138:2* (of David) "I will worship toward Your holy temple."

¹³⁶Ed Snitkoff, "My Jewish Learning: Settling All the Land," accessed 14 May 2012, <http://www.myjewishlearning.org>.

¹³⁷Ehud Spinzak, *Brother Against Brother*, 261–262.

¹³⁸Tractate Sanhedrin 4:5, in "Eyes Upon the Land: The Principles Underlying the Israel-Arab Conflict-At the Core of the Issue," *Chabad-Lubavitch Sichos in English*.

settlements have solidified the cause. According to Dan Tor, “The establishment of Gush Emunim settlements across the Green Line . . . required a few to take upon themselves the responsibility for determining the fate of the western Land of Israel.”¹³⁹ The partial end of the Jewish Exile, and establishment of Jewish rule over most of current Israel, has legitimized the “practical” approach for Rabbis asserting human effort to bring the Messiah.¹⁴⁰

Gush Emunim has been uncompromising on Torah principles for redemption. “The commandment that pounded in the heart of Joshua and the generation who captured Canaan, in the heart of David and Solomon, and their generation, the word of God in his Torah, is thus, as it was first purely stated, what motivates us.”¹⁴¹ Israel Eldad has explained that the obligation to fight compromise on land is drawn from the Exodus narrative. “Israel’s army is again facing the Egyptian army in the very same place where the first exodus took place under the leadership of Moses.”¹⁴² Because Moses did not compromise in his demands to depart Egypt and settle Canaan, nor shall the Gush Emunim.

F. GUSH EMUNIM-TEMPLE OBJECTION

The centrality of Jerusalem is critical for Jews’ objections to division of land. The Tanakh proclaims, “Behold I will tear the kingdom out of the hand of Solomon and will give ten tribes to you, but he shall have one tribe for the sake of My servant David, and

¹³⁹Dan Tor, “To Continue to Push” in Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord*, 112. Note: Tor is a vanguardists, who stress the decisive role of human effort in fulfilling God’s will, for Gush Emunim. Vanguardists are associated with what current polls show is Israel’s third largest party—Tehiya, formed in 1979 in angry response to Begin’s agreement to return the Sinai peninsula to Egypt. Ian Lustick, “Israel’s Dangerous Fundamentalists,” accessed 01 November 2012, http://members.tripod.com/alabasters_archive/dangerous_fundamentalists.html.

¹⁴⁰Aryeh Newman, in Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord*, 96–97, 106–107; See also Aryeh Newman, “The Centrality of Eretz Yisrael in Nachmanides,” *Tradition* 10, no.1 (Summer 1968) 21–30.

¹⁴¹Yehuda Etzion, “Finally to Raise the Banner of Jerusalem,” in Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord*, 98.

¹⁴²Israel Eldad, in Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord*, 102103; Note: Leviticus 26:40–46 describes the redemptive process, “(Hebrews) will be humbled and then they will gain appeasement for their sin. I will remember My covenant with Jacob . . . with Isaac, and . . . with Abraham will I remember, and I will remember the Land.”

for the sake of *Jerusalem, the city which I have chosen out of all the tribes of Israel.*”¹⁴³ Yehuda Etzion lived in one of Gush Emunim’s earliest settlements and promotes an obligation. “[We are] personally responsible to carry out actions which I would characterize as the purification of the Temple Mount, the only holy place of the people of Israel, from the structure now located upon it, on the site of the holy of holies, the building known as the Dome of the Rock.”¹⁴⁴ In short, practical messianism is closely tied to the temple.

The Jewish temple location in Jerusalem is a major source of contention between Jews and Muslims. Currently, Jews claim the Muslim al-Masjid al-Aqsa Mosque is built on the site of the first Jewish temple.¹⁴⁵ According to Jewish tradition, temple worship is meant only for the Jews, with strict penalties for breaking the religious laws.¹⁴⁶ Any non-Jewish establishment on the site of the Temple Mount is considered an abomination, or, as described, a “high place.”¹⁴⁷ Jews cannot compromise on the everlasting ordinance for the temple in Jerusalem.

Therefore, in order to re-establish the covenants, Zionists propose rebuilding the temple. Yehuda Etzion said God’s “painfully obvious” commandment to rebuild is comparable to Abraham’s willingness to offer his son Isaac, although Abraham could see no rational purpose in this.¹⁴⁸ Today, rabbis in Israel repeat the ancient prayer that, “the Temple may be speedily rebuilt in our day.”¹⁴⁹

¹⁴³1 Kings 11:31.

¹⁴⁴Yehuda Etzion, in Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord*, 97.

¹⁴⁵2 Chronicles 2:3–5 (emphasis added). Note: King Solomon, 3rd King of Israel, explained the significance of the Jerusalem Jewish temple forever, “Behold, I am building a temple for the name of the Lord my God, to dedicate it to him . . . This is an *ordinance forever to Israel*. And the temple which I build will be great, for our God is greater than all gods.

¹⁴⁶Chuck Swindoll, *Insight for Living Radio Broadcast*, 17 March 2009. This penalty was confirmed in 1871, when archaeologists found a warning on a tablet from a temple site dig, “no man from another race may enter the temple, penalty is death.”

¹⁴⁷Ehud Sprinzak, *Gush Emunim: The Politics of Zionist Fundamentalism in Israel*, 23–24 in Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord*, 97–98; Note: East Jerusalem was formerly controlled by Jordan, not Palestine, until Israel recaptured it in the 1967 Six Day War.; “on the site of the holy of holies,” 97.

¹⁴⁸Yehuda Etzion, “From the Laws of Existence to the Law of Destiny” *Nekuda*, no. 75, 6 July 1984, 23.

¹⁴⁹“Chancellor’s Parashah Commentary: Parashat Hayyei Sarah-Genesis 23:1–25:18,” The Jewish Theological Seminary.

G. HAMAS'S POLITICAL THEOLOGY

In Hamas's view, the land is Palestinian territory, and land rights of the people have been taken away by occupying Israeli forces. "The only way to regain Palestinian rights, was through resistance against the colonial occupation and wresting rights back from the enemy. Wherever a military occupation exists, a military resistance should be expected."¹⁵⁰ In order to understand this view, a historical religious analysis is necessary, beginning with Abraham.

The Muslim narrative of the genealogy of Abraham's descendants differs from the Jewish claim. Palestinians claim ownership of the land through Abraham's first-born son Ishmael and argue he was the one who was to be sacrificed before God intervened.¹⁵¹ Ishmael is believed to be the father of 12 princes, or tribes, of Ishmaelites. They also note that Isaac's son Esau married Canaanite wives, including Basemath, Ismael's daughter, giving birth to the Edomite tribe, which united with the Ishmaelites to form the Arabs.¹⁵² Palestinians argue that since they are descended from the Canaanites, who laid claim to the area before Abraham's time, they have rights of first possession.¹⁵³

The Hamas covenant is unequivocal regarding possession of the land. It claims that "Israel will exist until Islam will obliterate it," and "The Islamic Resistant Movement believes that the land of Palestine is an Islamic *waqf* consecrated for future Muslim generations until Judgment day. It or any part of it, should not be squandered . . . or given up."¹⁵⁴ However, the statements made by Hamas' political leaders conceal its theological

¹⁵⁰Khaled Hroub, *Hamas: A Beginner's Guide* (Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2007), 44; Note: Khaled Hroub is director of the Arab Media Project at Cambridge University.

¹⁵¹*Qur'an 37:99–109*, in Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill* (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 2003), 94; Maulana Muhammad Ali, *The Holy Qur'an* (Dublin, OH: Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isa'at Islam Lahore Inc, 2002), 58–60.

¹⁵²Radmacher, *The Nelson Study Bible*, 34. Note: *Genesis 36:3*

¹⁵³Lewicki et al., *Essentials of Negotiation*, 36.

¹⁵⁴Hamas Charter, Article 11. Note: *Waqf*, in Arabic language, means hold, confinement or prohibition. *Waqf* refers to land that has been designated as holy by previous Muslim conquerors. The word *waqf* is used in Islam in the meaning of holding certain property and preserving it for the confined benefit of certain philanthropy and prohibiting any use or disposition of it outside that specific objective. Islamic World, accessed 22 March 2012, http://www.islamicworld.net/economic/waqf/waqf_mainpage.html.

arguments, which are more difficult to sell.¹⁵⁵ Therefore, some inferences are drawn to establish the link between the political discourse and religious argumentation.

Hamas is specific about its territorial goals. Since the 1993 Oslo Declaration of Principles failed to establish a Palestinian state by 1999, the Palestinian National Authority created a basic law, which describes Islamic Shari'a law as its basis and holds that Jerusalem is the capital of Palestine.¹⁵⁶ Immediately after the formation of the Palestinian national unity government in 2007, "Hamas leader Khalid Mish'al made the movement's first unequivocal statement about its willingness to accept a Palestinian state confined to the territories captured by Israel in 1967."¹⁵⁷ These territories include the West Bank and Gaza. This is a distinct break from past Palestinian claims to all the land.

Hamas's interpretations of the Qur'an and Hadith are necessary for understanding their narrative for the land. The Palestinian Muslim claim to Jerusalem originates with the Qur'an's description of Muhammad's journey described in Qur'an 17:1, "Glory be to Him, who carried His servant (Muhammad) by night from the holy mosque to the further mosque."^{158,159} In a hadith, Muhammad describes his journey to Jerusalem: "On the night I was taken from Mecca to Jerusalem, Allah imposed fifty obligatory prayers upon my community."¹⁶⁰ That is why Jerusalem is significant to Hamas.

¹⁵⁵Hroub, *Hamas: A Beginner's Guide*, 44.

¹⁵⁶*The Amended Palestine Basic Law*, accessed 22 March 2012, http://www.usaid.gov/wbg/misc/amended_basic_law; Note: In theory, the Oslo agreement was divided into two phases. The first phase was a five-year interim phase, designed to test the Palestinian ability to self govern and control factions. Phase two would be a final settlement.

¹⁵⁷Azzam Tamimi, *Hamas: A History From Within* (Northampton: Olive Branch Press, 2007), 8.; Note: Mosab Hassan Yousef also encouraged his father, Sheikh Hassan Yousef, one of seven founders of Hamas, to pursue a peace agreement.

¹⁵⁸*Qur'an 17:1*.

¹⁵⁹Al-Hussaini. "The Qur'an's Covenant with the Jewish People," 9–10. Note: The general interpretation of the "further mosque" is Jerusalem or a place within it, and often claimed to be the site of Al-Aqsa mosque, built after Muhammad's death in 632 CE.

¹⁶⁰*Qur'an 17:1*, in al-Misri, *'Umdat al-Salik*, 108.

Jerusalem or *Haram al-Sharif*, is the most important political city for Hamas.¹⁶¹ Muslims believe the site of the Dome of the Rock is where Muhammad rose to heaven and where his footprint and Gabriel's handprint are embedded.¹⁶² Palestinian supporters argue that Palestine was established during the Muslim conquest of Jerusalem in 638 CE. Therefore, Palestinians have a territorial right to most of Israel.¹⁶³ Hamas claims that Jews are censured from the area surrounding the Dome of the Rock.¹⁶⁴

Muslim claims to Jerusalem are also based on perceived Jewish disobedience. Muhammad's wife Aisha claimed he placed a curse on the Jews in his last words, "Let there be curse upon the Jews and Christians that they have taken the graves of their Apostles as places of worship."¹⁶⁵ Some Muslims claim that early Jews perverted the Torah and therefore do not have rights to Jerusalem anymore.¹⁶⁶ At one time Hamas said that Palestinian Jews who peacefully co-existed in the land for centuries would be welcome to stay, but Western and other foreign Jews who migrated to the land should return to their countries of origin. Hamas has since dropped this belief and has given no new answer regarding status of Jews.¹⁶⁷

Although the 1948 UN Resolution 194 gave Palestinian refugees the right to return to their lands, Hamas believes that Western countries have not placed serious pressure on the Israeli government to allow refugees to return and be compensated for losing homes and property. With the perceived failure of Oslo, the Second Intifada of

¹⁶¹Jerusalem is the third most important religious city for Islam. Means "Noble Sanctuary"; Hamas Charter, Article 15; Isabel Kershner, "Unusual Partners Study Divisive Jerusalem Site" *The New York Times*, 15 November 2009, accessed 14 May 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com>.

¹⁶²Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God*, 94. Note: Gabriel is an angel.

¹⁶³Ilan Pappé, "Post-Zionist Critique on Israel and the Palestinians: Part 1: The Academic Debate," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26, no. 2 (1997): 30.

¹⁶⁴Hamas Charter, Article 15; Note: Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa mosque are co-located.

¹⁶⁵Ram Swarup, *Understanding the Hadith: The Sacred Traditions of Islam* (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2002), 41.

¹⁶⁶"Corruption in Judaism, A Human Trend," <http://www.submission.org/jews/talmud.html> (accessed 9 June 2012); Note: *Qur'an* 5:66–69 "If they had only followed the Torah . . . they would have enjoyed happiness and satisfaction."

¹⁶⁷Hroub, *Hamas: A Beginner's Guide*, 35.

2000 gave Hamas more influence and its resistance to land occupation.¹⁶⁸ Hamas rejects peace treaties with Israel conditional on full Palestinian recognition of the right of Israel to exist.¹⁶⁹

H. HAMAS-CREATION OF AN ISLAMIC STATE

One of Hamas's slogans, "The Qur'an is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people," captures its belief that Islam is the authority for governance.¹⁷⁰ "Hamas, in the Islamic language, means that it derives its guiding principles from the doctrines and values of Islam . . . It is from the values of Islam that the movement seeks its inspiration and mobilization."¹⁷¹ Hamas's charter argues that it "is necessary to instill in the minds of the Muslim generations that the Palestinian problem is a *religious* problem, and should be dealt with on this basis."¹⁷² For a Palestinian, their identity is first to Islam, which is linked to the land.¹⁷³ For Hamas's desired new government, "Allah is its target, the Prophet is its model, the Koran its constitution: Jihad is its path and death for the sake of Allah is the loftiest of its wishes."¹⁷⁴ Hamas aims for a pure Islamic religious utopia where the Islamic state fulfilled the needs of its people.¹⁷⁵ In November 1994, Hamas, leaders claimed the issues were, "the homeland, Jerusalem, the [Palestinian] prisoners, [and Jewish] settlements."¹⁷⁶

Hamas's main goal is the replacement, or abrogation, of other beliefs with the Islamization of society.¹⁷⁷ Khaled Mishal characterized Hamas as "an Islamic movement,

¹⁶⁸Hroub, *Hamas: A Beginner's Guide*, 106–7.

¹⁶⁹Hroub, *Hamas: A Beginner's Guide*, xv.

¹⁷⁰Mahmud al-Zahar to al-Quds, *Islamic Fundamentalism* in Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela *The Palestinian Hamas* (Columbia University Press, 2000).

¹⁷¹Hroub, *Hamas: A Beginner's Guide*, 18.

¹⁷²Hamas Charter, Article 15.

¹⁷³*The Amended Palestine Basic Law*, accessed 11 September 2011, http://www.usaid.gov/wbg/misc/amended_basic_law.

¹⁷⁴Hamas Charter, Article 8.

¹⁷⁵Hroub, *Hamas: A Beginner's Guide*, 20.

¹⁷⁶Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela *The Palestinian Hamas* (Columbia University Press, 2000).

¹⁷⁷Hroub, *Hamas: A Beginner's Guide*, 28; *Qur'an* 2:106.

a nationalist movement, a militant movement, a political movement . . . that fused Islam and nationalism.”¹⁷⁸ Robinson writes: “Waqf implies sovereignty Allah’s sovereignty over an entire country . . . [The] Hamas frame that Islam and only Islam is the answer is quite powerful.”¹⁷⁹ Islamists claim that the Tanakh is corrupted, therefore Jewish beliefs are objectionable, and have been “replaced with something better [Islam].”¹⁸⁰ Therefore, Hamas claims that Jew claims to Israel and Jerusalem are invalid.¹⁸¹ As the Hamas charter notes, “fight against the false, defeating it and vanquishing it so that justice could prevail, homelands be retrieved and from its mosques would the voice of the mu’azen emerge declaring the establishment of the state of Islam.”¹⁸² In Hamas’s view, in order to be Islamic, within Palestine and the umma, one must support the struggle for the establishment of an Islamic state in Palestine.^{183,184}

I. HAMAS-STRUGGLE TO ESTABLISH THE ISLAMIC STATE

Since Palestine was established in the land prior to external intervention, Hamas claims that jihad and retaliation are justified to regain lost lands. Khaled Hroub expounds,

¹⁷⁸Mouin Rabbani, “The Making of a Palestinian Islamist Leader: An Interview with Khalid Mishal,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 147, no. 3 (2008): 65, 69. Note: Mishal (Abu Walid) is a founder of Hamas, and head of its politbureau since 1996, recognized as head of the movement since the assassination of Yasin in 2004.

¹⁷⁹Robinson, “Hamas as Social Movement,” 130–131.

¹⁸⁰Muslim narrative of the Tanakh having been replaced by the Qur’an is in Qur’an 5:48, “To you We sent the Book (the Qur’an) in truth confirming the Scripture that came before it.” The Jewish Tanakh was replaced as indicated in Qur’an 2:106, “None of Our revelations do We change or cause to be forgotten, but We substitute something better or similar.”; Qur’an 7:157–158, “Those who follow the Messenger, Prophet, the unlettered who can neither read nor write, whom they find mentioned in their own—in the Torah—for he (the Prophet commands them what is just and forbids them what is evil . . . say: ‘O Mankind! I am sent to you all, as the Messenger of Allah, to Whom belongs the kingdom of the heavens and the earth: there is no god but He.’” Also, “His inspired message . . . superseding and abrogating all previous religious systems with the Prophet’s Sacred Law,” Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri, ‘Umdat al-Salik, 822.

¹⁸¹Itamar Marcus and Barbara Crook. “PA Leader calls for killing all Jews and Americans” accessed 16 October 2012, *Palestinian Media Watch*, http://www.pmw.org.il/Bulletins_Apr2007.htm; Note: *Qur’an* 17:2 “Do not take (anyone) other than Me to be the Disposer of (your) affairs.”

¹⁸²Hamas Charter, Article 9.

¹⁸³Hamas Charter, Article 11. Note: *Umma* is the community of Muslim believers.

¹⁸⁴Hroub, *Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide*, xviii. Note: Hroub describes Hamas’s lack of support base for its religious aims, “Many Palestinians support the nationalist/liberationist and social work of Hamas, but not its religious ideal. Hamas purposefully overlooks this fact, and instead considers any vote for its political agenda as a vote for its religious one too.”

“ Hamas preaches the Islamic religious call while harmoniously embracing the strategy of armed struggle against an occupying Israel.”¹⁸⁵ Hamas’s jihad is against Zionists who have, in their view, been occupying Muslim homelands and holy places.¹⁸⁶ Hamas’s formal declarations of its goals include “the total liberation of the historic land of Palestine from the River Jordan to the Mediterranean Sea,”¹⁸⁷ and Hamas senior leader Fathi Hammad has declared, “We will not rest until we destroy the Zionist entity.”¹⁸⁸ 189 190

In short, *jihad* is seen as a necessary means to solve the land dispute. Hasan al-Banna, founder of Muslim Brotherhood, a precursor to Hamas, wrote that “jihad is an obligation from Allah on every Muslim and cannot be ignored or evaded. Allah has ascribed great importance to jihad and has made the reward of the martyrs and the fighters a splendid one.”¹⁹¹ Dr. A.M.A. Fahmy wrote, “every person should according to Islam prepare himself/herself for jihad, and every person should eagerly and patiently wait for the day when Allah will call them to show their willingness to sacrifice their lives. We should all ask ourselves, is there a quicker way to heaven?”¹⁹² ,¹⁹³ The Hamas charter articulated the reasons, “There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through *jihad*. Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are all a waste of time

¹⁸⁵Hroub, *Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide*, xiv-xv.; Note: 1917 Balfour Declaration, 1922 British Mandate, 1948 U.N. authorization are viewed as external intervention.

¹⁸⁶1993 Hamas Introductory Memorandum, in Hroub, *Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide*, 22–23.

¹⁸⁷1993 Hamas Introductory Memorandum, in Hroub, *Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide*, 21.

¹⁸⁸Fathi Hammad, “West Bank Anger over Gaza Raids” *BBC News*, 2 January 2009, accessed 22 March 2012, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7808257.stm.

¹⁸⁹1993 Hamas Introductory Memorandum, in Hroub, *Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide*, 22. Note: Per Memorandum, the kingdoms of the earth belong to God, and God’s followers should inherit the land

¹⁹⁰Hamas Charter, Articles 2–3. Note: Hamas’s stated goal is the replacement of Israel with an Islamic State.

¹⁹¹Hasan Al-Banna, *Jihad*, in Jim Lacey, *The Cannons of Jihad: Terrorists’ Strategy for Defeating America*, 5.

¹⁹²A.M.A. Fahmy, preface to Al-Banna, *Jihad* in Jim Lacey, *The Cannons of Jihad: Terrorists’ Strategy for Defeating America*, 5.

¹⁹³Al-Banna, Hasan, citing Surat an-Nisaa’ [4], ayah 74, in *Jihad*, in Jim Lacey, *The Cannons of Jihad: Terrorists’ Strategy for Defeating America*, 6. Note: Al-Banna, citing the Qur’an “let those who sell the life of this world for the Hereafter fight in the cause of Allah, and whosoever fights in the Cause of Allah, and is killed or is victorious, We shall bestow on him a great reward.”

and vain endeavors.”¹⁹⁴ ,¹⁹⁵ Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, one of the founders of Hamas and spiritual leader reasoned, “I was motivated, to launch the battle as early as 1967. However, whenever we studied the circumstances and assessed the resources we found them insufficient and had to postpone. Then we would study the case once more then postpone again.”¹⁹⁶ There is an endstate to jihad.

Hamas vows to continuously confront and resist Jewish presence in the land until the medium-term goals are achieved.¹⁹⁷ Jihad, or struggle, is a persistent endeavor that will culminate in the establishment of an Islamic state in the West Bank and Gaza and destruction of Israel.¹⁹⁸ “To realize its end, Hamas is engaged in a ‘resistance programme’ which includes armed struggle and political conduct . . . Yet Hamas’ leaders repeat that ‘resistance is not an end in itself,’ hinting at a correctly timed political strategy.¹⁹⁹ Hamas believes that all of the land is Palestinian and resistance is necessary to both deter Jewish presence and establish an Islamic state.

According to Sunni Muslim law, it is an imperative to first invite a person to become a Muslim. If they refuse, then a person may enter the social *order* of Islam by paying the non-Muslim poll tax or fight.²⁰⁰ The Sunni law definition of Jihad helps in understanding the purpose for jihad. “*Jihad* means to war against non-Muslims, and is etymologically derived from the word mujahada, signifying warfare to *establish the religion*. And it is the lesser jihad. As for the *greater jihad*, it is spiritual warfare against

¹⁹⁴Hamas Charter, Article 13.

¹⁹⁵Hamas Charter, Preamble. Note: The preamble of the Hamas Charter calls on the entire Islamic world to conduct a jihad against Jews and the state of Israel.

¹⁹⁶Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, visit to Qatar 1998, as used in Tamimi, *Hamas: A History From Within*, 35.

¹⁹⁷Hroub, *Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide*, 23. Note: During pre and post 2006 electoral victory, Hamas emphasized neither the Islamic state nor the total liberation of Palestine. Instead, it disclosed the medium term goals, the West Bank and Gaza, that must be achieved temporarily before engaging the long term strategy, 20– 23.

¹⁹⁸Hroub, *Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide*, xiv, 28.

¹⁹⁹Hroub, *Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide*, 102.

²⁰⁰al-Misri, ‘*Umdat al-Salik*, 602. Note: entering the social order includes subjugation, historically known as becoming a “dhimmi.” This will be discussed further on pages 5254 in the section on peace.

the lower self (nafs), which is why the Prophet said as he was returning from jihad.”²⁰¹ In the Qur’an, the only three reasons for fighting include halting aggression, protecting the Islam mission, and defending religious freedom.²⁰²

In Hamas’s struggle for Palestine, since Muslims are not fighting Muslims, there is near consensus among Islamists everywhere on justification for Hamas’s struggle.²⁰³ Jihad in the land is a continuous process and decreases only momentarily for a purpose. There are those who fight and those who support the fight. “Those of the believers who are unhurt but sit behind are not equal to those who fight in Allah’s path with their property and lives. Allah has preferred those who fight with their property and lives a whole degree above those who sit behind.”²⁰⁴ If a person takes the Hamas perspective that Palestinians governed the land prior to twentieth century Zionist and Western influence, then this legal interpretation helps in understanding reasons for jihad. “The first is when they are in their own countries, in which case jihad is a communal obligation . . . the second state is when non-Muslims invade a Muslim country or near to one, in which case jihad is personally obligatory.”²⁰⁵ Additionally, Hamas points to this surah, “Fight those who do not believe in Allah and the Last Day and who forbid not what Allah and His messenger have forbidden—who do not practice the religion of truth, being of

²⁰¹al-Misri, ‘*Umdat al-Salik*, 599 (emphasis added). Note: Note: “He (Muhamamad) fought in eight of them [battles], and killed only one person with his noble hand, Ubayy ibn Khalaf, at the battle of Uhud. On the latter expeditions he sent others to fight, himself remaining at *Medina*, and these were forty-seven in number.”

²⁰²Shaltut, “The Koran and Fighting,” in Aboul-Enein, Youssef and Sherifa Zuhur. *Islamic Rulings on Warfare*, 11. Note: Shaltut is a professor at Sunni al-Azhar University in Egypt.

²⁰³Hroub, *Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide*, 96. Note: A new Islamic group associated with Hamas called Jaysh al-Umma (Islam’s army) recently declared, “Muslims all over the world are obliged to fight the Israelis and the infidels until only Islam rules the earth.” Raymond Ibrahim, “War and Peace-and Deceit-in Islam,” *Middle East Forum*, accessed 12 February 2012, <http://www.meforum.org/2066/war-and-peace-and-deceit-in-islam>.; Sunni Muslims believe that jihad can be initiated by a political leader with the affirmation of religious leaders. Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, “The Development of Jihad in Islamic Revelation and History,” in James T. Johnson and John Kelsay, eds., *Cross, Crescent, and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Tradition* (New York, NY: Greenwood, 1990), 41–47. There is also a temporary community obligation to support jihad, “jihad is a communal obligation. When enough people perform it to successfully accomplish it, it is no longer obligatory upon others.” al-Misri, ‘*Umdat al-Salik*, 599–600.

²⁰⁴Qur’an 4:94, in al-Misri, ‘*Umdat al-Salik*, 599–600.

²⁰⁵al-Misri, ‘*Umdat al-Salik*, 600– 601. Note: “If unable, because of illness or the death of one’s mount when not able to fight on foot, or because one no longer has a weapon, then one may leave. One may also leave if the opposing non-Muslim army is more than twice the size of the Muslim force,” 601.

those who have been given the Book-until they pay the poll tax out of hand and are humbled.”^{206,207} In this instance, Hamas precludes the internal, or *greater jihad*, and chooses the interpretations that foster *violence*.

The purpose of Hamas’s religious jihad is to first regain the West Bank and Gaza.²⁰⁸ The 1948 re-establishment of Israel and the 1967 annex of the West Bank and Gaza was viewed as an invasion, therefore justifying jihad.²⁰⁹ Hamas views retaliatory attacks as an “eye for an eye.” Sheikh Yassin argues, “The illness (the occupation and the settlements) persists and as long as it does there is no hope for peace.”²¹⁰ Hamas believes that the 2005 unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza validated its jihad methodology.²¹¹

Hamas’s zeal is also based on retaliation for Palestinian deaths. According to the Qur’an, retaliation is obligatory.²¹² In a Hadith from *‘Umdat al-Salik*, Muhammad is written to have that “the blood of a Muslim man who testifies that there is no god but Allah and that I am the Messenger of Allah is not lawful to shed unless he be one of three: a married adulterer, someone killed in *retaliation* for killing another, or someone who abandons his religion and the Muslim community.”²¹³ Sheikh Ikrima Sabri, the mufti of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Authority, has designated martyrdom operations as “a noble act of sacrifice for the sake of God.”^{214, 215} “When the Muslim explodes himself . . . he only performs an act of self-defense; it is martyrdom because the recompense for

²⁰⁶*Qur’an* 9:29, in al-Misri, *‘Umdat al-Salik*, 602. Note: written in the battle for Medina era.

²⁰⁷al-Misri, *‘Umdat al-Salik*, 599. Note: The Prophet Muhammad qualified jihad as the utmost worldly treasure, “To go forth in the morning or evening to fight in the path of Allah is better than the whole world and everything in it.” Spoken in final years of his life, during violent Medina era.

²⁰⁸Khalid Mish’al in Tamimi, *Hamas: A History From Within*, 8.

²⁰⁹Andrew G. Bostom, “Negating the Legacy of Jihad in Palestine,” 819.

²¹⁰Ahmed Yassin, interview with Miriam Shahin, “Sheikh Yassin Speaks Out,” *The Middle East*, December 2001, 11.

²¹¹Hroub, *Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide*, 44.

²¹²*Qur’an* 2:178. Note: “O you who believe, retaliation is prescribed for you regarding the slain.”

²¹³al-Misri, *‘Umdat al-Salik*, 583.

²¹⁴Tamimi, *Hamas: A History From Within*, 181.

²¹⁵Hroub, *Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide*, xvii.

an injury is an injury equal thereto.”²¹⁶ This is important because Hamas is the first Sunni group to utilize suicide bombings.²¹⁷ Carlebach wrote that “occupation by force of arms, in their own eyes, in the eyes of Islam, is not at all associated with injustice. To the contrary, it constitutes a certificate and demonstration of authentic ownership.”²¹⁸ Indeed, Hamas has acknowledged that politically and strategically motivated suicide attacks have become its strongest influence with Israeli government.²¹⁹

In short, there seems to be only one option available in the current religious frameworks. Inconsistency in considering the *political theology* of competing groups has contributed to alienation, heightened insecurities and self doubt, negative emotional resonance, and subsequent increased tension. Upon considering *political theology* of Hamas, there is no provision in the Quran for Muslims to own the land. But Hamas’s religious ideologues argue that the land once was Muslim controlled, therefore jihad is necessary to return to Muslim authority.²²⁰ Religious Zionists refuse to divide the land that has been promised to them by God as an everlasting covenant, and claim domain prior to Muslim intervention.²²¹ These two views are mutually exclusive and suggest that there is no religious solution in this framework or context. However, it is suggested that the call to jihad and practical messianism can be suppressed via religious denouncements of violence made by Hamas and Gush Emunim leadership, in order to move toward promoting major themes of peace within the source texts.

²¹⁶Sheikh Sayyid Tantawi, *Al-Hayat*, in Tamimi, *Hamas: A History From Within*, 171. Note: Applying the notion of warfare to establish the religion, also consider what Sheikh Sayyid Tantawi, grand sheikh of al-Azhar University in Egypt, influential school for Sunni Muslims stated about martyrdom.

²¹⁷Tamimi, *Hamas: A History From Within*, 171.

²¹⁸Dr. A. Carlebach in Andrew G. Bostom, “Negating the Legacy of Jihad in Palestine,” 819. Note: also published in Ma’ariv in 1995

²¹⁹Hroub, *Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide*, 53.

²²⁰Hroub, *Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide*, 44; Lewicki et al., *Essentials of Negotiation*, 36.

²²¹² *Samuel 7:12–17*, “The Davidic covenant stated through the prophet Nathan is, “He (David) shall build a house for My name, and I will establish the throne of his *kingdom forever*. I will be his Father, and he shall be My son. If he commits iniquity, I will *chasten* him . . . but my *mercy* shall not depart from him.”

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III. CLOSING THE PEACE GAP

“The principal contribution that religious actors can bring to secular confrontations is their unique potential for *mediating* conflict in situations where a mutually debilitating impasse has been reached.”²²² Juergensmeyer claims “the most successful solutions are those that have been forged on a moral plane- those that have required the opponents in the conflict to summon at least a minimal level of mutual trust and respect.”²²³ Similarly, Juergensmeyer concludes that a solution to religious violence occurs when government “authorities embrace moral values, including those associated with *religion*.”²²⁴ Battling for land, in their current framework, religious Zionists refuse to divide the land that has been promised to them by God.²²⁵ Religious Palestinian ideologues also refuse to relinquish their claims to the land.²²⁶ However, the Tanakh and the Qur’an, and associated commentaries contain resources for conciliation and peaceful relationships. Understanding both political objections based on religious argumentation and peaceful themes should be considered in *context* for a narrative. Rabbi Michael Melchior once noted that “all previous peace plans lacked religious legitimization.”²²⁷ This chapter suggests ways to open dialogue between the Israeli and Palestinian cultures.

In fostering dialogue, highlighting *peaceful* religious frameworks can build an alternative durable way ahead that has *emotional resonance* with Jews and Muslims.²²⁸

²²²Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft*, 265.

²²³Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: the Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 243.

²²⁴Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God*, 243–244.

²²⁵2 Samuel 7:12–17, “The Davidic covenant stated through the prophet Nathan is, “He (David) shall build a house for My name, and I will establish the throne of his *kingdom forever*. I will be his Father, and he shall be My son. If he commits iniquity, I will *chasten* him . . . but my *mercy* shall not depart from him.”

²²⁶Hroub, *Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide*, 44; Roy Lewicki et al., *Essentials of Negotiation*, 36.

²²⁷David R. Smock, “Religious Contributions to Peacemaking: When Religion Brings Peace, not War” (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, January 2006), 9. Note: Rabbi Melchior was former minister for Jewish diaspora affairs in the Israeli Cabinet.

²²⁸Schrock, Holden, and Reid 2004, in Belinda Robnett, “Emotional Resonance, Social Location, and Strategic Framing,” University of California, Irvine *Sociological Focus* 37, no. 3:195–212 August 2004, 195–196; Note: “the degree of ‘emotional harmony and/or disjuncture’ between ideology, practices or ‘collective action frames and the emotional lives of potential recruits.’”

The important aspect of *emotional resonance* is that it interacts with other cultural and structural dynamics to produce framing outcomes.²²⁹ In short, this means the appeal of the movement positively shapes the cultural and political components toward a palatable narrative. The main conclusion is that “if emotion can motivate, then they can also serve to undermine [negative] collective action.”²³⁰ For example, emotional resonance was instrumental in the 1960–1965 Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee’s (SNCC) efforts to eliminate segregation. SNCC formed an independent civil rights organization based on democratic principles and *nonviolent* activism.²³¹ So, to a degree, where a person stands on an issue depends on *context*. By adjusting the information about an event, thereby adjusting the frames, one can hope to positively impact the outcome.

The goal here is to identify *alternative frames* within the Hamas and Gush Emunim that have *emotional resonance* and foster meaningful dialogue toward peace. These religiously based justifications will be helpful for increasing emotional resonance, shaping political narratives and curbing violent behavior. A comprehensive analysis of religious source documents indicates a co-existing Jewish Israeli and Muslim Palestinian presence in Israel. In summary, the arguments for a reframed *political theology* of each group are the following themes: patriarchs’s leadership example, tolerance within the religions, concepts of protection and forgiveness and a discussion on common ground.

A. PATRIARCHS’ EXAMPLE.

Abraham’s (Ibrahim) faith is attested in both the Qur’an and Torah and resonates with Jews and Muslims, suggesting that his example encourages unmerited favor for both

²²⁹Belinda Robnett, “Emotional Resonance, Social Location, and Strategic Framing,” 195–210.

²³⁰Robnett, “Emotional Resonance,” 195–212.

²³¹Robnett, “Emotional Resonance,” 195–196. “These ideals provided the basis for SNCC’s (Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee) strategic master frames and practices that, initially, precluded the need to frame race and gender in the organization. The organization’s practices contradicted larger societal beliefs regarding race and gender relations. Like race, gender was initially an innovative practice that was later threatened by the influx of new recruits. The different outcomes were a result of several factors that led to different degrees of emotional resonance between black and white participants. Race and gender practices in SNCC were subject to multiple meanings, or polysemy (Sewell 1992). Groups within SNCC interpreted the meaning of the practices differently because of their place in society and the organization (Klandermans 1997). This paper concludes that social location determines interpretation and meaning and, therefore, the degree of emotional resonance. Emotional resonance is a powerful motivator that stimulates or impedes the need for frame development,” 195–196.

groups.²³² The Jewish Torah declares that through Abraham “*all* the families of the earth shall be blessed.”²³³ Could both groups adopt a moderate narrative sub-theme, that through Abraham all people can have prosperity and obedience to God?

Moreover, the Jewish patriarch David demonstrated a willingness to both negotiate with other cultures and demonstrate *unmerited favor*. David escaped Jewish King Saul’s persecution by entering into an agreement with Philistine King Achish.²³⁴ David, the exile, persuaded King Achish to give him refuge in the city of Ziklag.²³⁵ Later, David remarkably honored the authority of King Saul by not killing him during a chance opportunity.²³⁶ When David succeeded Saul as king, he maintained Ziklag, refrained from exterminating the seven Canaanite nations,²³⁷ and asked God whether to pursue the Amalekites, demonstrating *patience* rather than hasty *violence*.²³⁸⁻²³⁹ Thistlethwaite and Stassen claim that the laws against the seven nations of Canaan were

²³²*Qur’an* 16:120–122 “Verily, Ibrahim (Abraham) was a true model, piously obedient to God, true in faith”; Genesis 15:6 “Abraham believed God, and it was accounted to him for righteousness.”

²³³Genesis 12:1–3.

²³⁴*1 Sam* 27:1–2; ‘Now I shall *perish* someday by the hand of Saul. There is nothing better for me than that I should speedily escape to the land of the Philistines; and Saul will despair of me, to seek me anymore in any part of Israel. So I shall escape out of his hand.’ Then David arose and went over with the six hundred men who were with him to Achish the son of Maoch, king of Gath. *1 Sam* 18:16–10 King Saul was jealous of David’s victory over Goliath, and the Jewish people’s song of victory, “Saul killed his thousands, and David killed his ten thousands,” fearing David would next seek his throne. Note: Footnotes in Rabbi Nosson Scherman, 715–717 explain David’s logic in seeking refuge until he can gain the throne as promised by God.; In approximately 2,064 B.C. Hashem made a covenant with Abram included in *Genesis* 15:18–21 “to your descendants I have given this land, *from the river of Egypt to the great river, the River Euphrates*—the Kenites, the Kenezites, the Kadmonites, the Hittites, the Perizzites, the Rephaim, the Amorites, the Canaanites, the Girgashites, and the Jebusites.”

²³⁵Wayne Blank, “Ziklag,” accessed 27 October 2011, <http://www.keyway.ca/htm2001/20010910.htm>.

²³⁶*1 Samuel* 24:19. Note: King Saul proclaimed, “For if a man finds his enemy, will he let him get away safely? Therefore, may the Lord *reward* you with good for what you have done to me this day.”

²³⁷*1 Samuel* 24:19; *1 Samuel* 27:6 “So Achish gave David Ziklag that day. Therefore, Ziklag has belonged to the kings of Judah to this day. Now the time that David dwelt in the country of the Philistines was one full year and four months.” Note: Judah was the southern portion of Israel, and a son of Jacob (later named Israel).

²³⁸Thistlethwaite and Stassen, “Abrahamic Alternatives to War,” 5; Note: David writes the powerful Psalm 139:23–24, “Search me, O God, and know my heart; try me, and know my anxieties; and see if there is any wicked way in me, and *lead me* in the way everlasting.”

²³⁹Abraham Kook, *Tov Ro’i* (Jerusalem 5760), 22; Note: Post Exodus from Egypt, Hebrews were commanded by God to eliminate the seven Canaanite nations. Kook noted that David refrained from exterminating the seven nations of Canaan during his reign.

only *contextually* relevant the ancient establishment of the Jews in the land, not to current conflicts.²⁴⁰ But, per Menahem Kasher's argument, Amalek is only a metaphor for evil.²⁴¹ Some interpret Amalek not as a representative of evil, but rather a propensity that all communities are vulnerable, and therefore must unite to defeat evil.²⁴² Additionally, King David demonstrated *favor* by including Obil, an Ishmaelite, as one of his state officials.²⁴³ David's *unmerited favor* toward enemies is a theme that can encourage similar behavior today, thus leading to harmonious *emotional resonance*.

Continuing the positive theme, Jonah and King Solomon promoted similar unmerited favor, or grace. The prophet Jonah described his surrender to God's grace toward his enemy. Jonah reluctantly asks his enemy in Ninevah to pray and turn from their wicked ways. This ultimately leads to God's mercy and the saving of Ninevah.²⁴⁴ Similarly, King Solomon promoted patient restraint: "He who is slow to anger is better than a strong man, and a master of his passions (is better) than a conqueror of a city."²⁴⁵

Comparably, Muslim jurisprudence favors agreements. The term *hudna* means a peace treaty with those hostile to Islam, involving a cessation of fighting for a specified period.²⁴⁶ A truce resonates with Muslims since Muhammad and his followers retreated

²⁴⁰Thistlethwaite and Stassen, "Abrahamic Alternatives to War," 3.

²⁴¹Menahem Kasher in Thistlethwaite and Stassen, "Abrahamic Alternatives to War," 5,18.

²⁴²Thistlethwaite and Stassen, "Abrahamic Alternatives to War," 2, 18.

²⁴³*The Holy Scriptures* (Philadelphia, PA: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1955), 1218. Note: 1 Chronicles 27:30; Consider the significance of Ishmaelites, descendants of Ishmael, one of the two sons of Abraham (see also page 24, 31, 34). While there is no clear connection between the Ishmaelites of 972 BCE and Palestinians, example is an important concept for Jewish and Muslim religions. Additionally, Obil the Ishmaelite cared for King David's camels.

²⁴⁴*Jonah 1–4*. Note: Jonah did not want to carry out God's command to prophecy. He feared that Ninevah's repentance would imply condemnation of the people of Israel, who had defied the warnings and exhortations of the prophets, in Rabbi Nosson Scherman, Tanach: The Stone Edition, 1372.

²⁴⁵*Proverbs 16:7*; Note: Solomon's wisdom preceded him.

²⁴⁶Denis MacEoin, "Tactical Hudna and Islamist Intolerance," *Middle East Quarterly* (Summer 2008): 39, <http://www.meforum.org/1925/tactical-hudna-and-islamist-intolerance> (accessed 22 October 2011). Note: This is most prominently known in Arabic as *hudna*, but also can be other words like *tahdiya*, depending on the context. The word *hudna* will be used regarding Muslim Palestinians to address the peace between parties; "Tahadiya refers to a short-term calming period between conflicting parties during which differences are not put aside. A tahadiya stopped most violence between Hamas and Israel from June to December 2008." Paul Scham and Osama Abu-Irshaid. "Hamas Ideological Rigidity and Political Flexibility." Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace (2009). accessed 11 November 2012, <http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS118055>.

to Medina, known as the *hijra* (emigration).²⁴⁷ While in Medina, Muhammad's followers rearmed, returned to Mecca, and negotiated a ten year truce with the Quraysh tribe, permitting Muslims to return *unarmed* on annual pilgrimages.²⁴⁸

In addition to the hadith, a religious based peace treaty is justified in the Qur'an. Support for a truce is derived from the following verses: Qur'an 9:1 "An acquittal from Allah and His messenger," Qur'an 8:61 "If they incline towards peace, then incline towards it also." According to Sunni law, "there must be an interest served in making a truce other than mere preservation of the status quo."²⁴⁹ In the Qur'an, the righteous should not waiver from the cause. "Do not be fainthearted and call for peace, when it is you who are the uppermost."²⁵⁰ Furthermore, brokering peace is constrained by the following: "the only one who may effect a *truce* is the *Muslim ruler* of a region (or his representative) with a segment of the non-Muslims of the region, or the *caliph*."²⁵¹ The *leader* deciding on *truce* is the way a message can *resonate*.

Within certain guidelines, making a truce has *resonated* with Hamas. "Sheikh Yassin was Hamas's main ideologue, mobilizer, pragmatist, and populist . . . Yassin suggested the idea of *hudna* (truce), with which Hamas could reach a mutual ceasefire with Israel without breaking from its religious or nationalist principles."²⁵² On June 19, 2008, Israel and Hamas, the de facto state government in Gaza, agreed on a six-month

²⁴⁷Rudolph Peters, *Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History* (The Hague: Mouton, 1979), 41–42.

²⁴⁸al-Misri, 'Umdat al-Salik, 604–605. Note: text reads, "A truce may be made for ten years if necessary, for the Prophet made a truce with Quraysh (in the year of Hudaibiya) for that long, as is related by Abu Dawud." Other schools of law hold the same ten year period limit. Rudolph Peters, in "Esposito," *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World*, vol 2, 371; Rudolf Peters, *Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History*, 33.

²⁴⁹al-Misri, 'Umdat al-Salik, 605.

²⁵⁰Qur'an 47:35; Note: No information on time restrictions on negotiations is found in the Tanakh.

²⁵¹al-Misri, 'Umdat al-Salik, 599, 604–605; Note: However, if the caliph desires to resume war, he may do so in order to keep jihad from falling away.

²⁵²Hroub, *Hamas: A Beginner's Guide*, 124.

truce or *tahdiya*. This leader initiated peaceful approach has already yielded some results. Sheikh Yousef's son encouraged his father *to pursue* a peace agreement with Israel.²⁵³

B. TOLERANCE

Tolerance is a key theme for both groups. It is defined here as the ability of a group to not fully accept the beliefs and practice of another religion, yet respect the *life* of the individuals. This understanding appears within Islam, "The Qur'an seems to indicate a degree of tolerance. Verse 2.256 states: "there is no compulsion in religion." Two further suras, 10 and 18, include passages indicating that people who do not wish to believe should not be forced to."²⁵⁴ Some Muslim authorities explain that sword-forced conversion is unreasonable and acceptance should be purely an action of the *free will*.²⁵⁵ Muslim scholars explained that the Qur'an, "reaffirms the validity of other religions and requires its followers to *respect* the scriptures of other faiths."²⁵⁶ Different sects in Islam have emphasized the several levels of jihad, citing the struggle to live righteously is the most difficult and important.²⁵⁷ Yet today, Jews are allowed to walk around but not *pray* at the site of the Temple Mount.²⁵⁸ According to Denis MacEoin, reform in narratives is necessary to "control the violent tendencies of the extremists but also to rework Muslim theology and social thought."²⁵⁹

There are historical Islamic precedents for religious freedom. According to the hadith, the Prophet Muhammad once stated:

²⁵³Yousef, Mosab Hassan, "They Need to Be Liberated From Their God." Wall Street Journal, 06 March 2010, accessed 04 July 2012. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703915204575103481069258868.html>; Note: Sheikh Yousef was one of the seven original founders of Hamas.

²⁵⁴Catholic Online, "Whoever changes his Islamic religion, kill him' Hadith- Sahih Al-Bukhari (9:57)," accessed 27 April 2012, http://www.catholic.org/international/international_story.php?id=31347.

²⁵⁵Rudolf Peters, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam* (Princeton: Markus Weiner, 1996), 68–79.

²⁵⁶Thistlethwaite and Stassen, "Abrahamic Alternatives to War," 10. Note: 2008 Just Peacemaking conference.

²⁵⁷Thistlethwaite and Stassen, "Abrahamic Alternatives to War," 5.

²⁵⁸Isabel Kershner, "Unusual Partners Study Divisive Jerusalem Site" The New York Times, 15 November 2009, accessed 14 May 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/15/world/middleeast/15mount.html>.

²⁵⁹Denis MacEoin, "Tactical Hudna and Islamist Intolerance," 47–48. Note: MacEoin was Chief Editor of the *Middle East Quarterly* and lecturer in Islamic studies.

To the Christians of Najran and the neighboring territories, the *pledge* of His Prophet are extended for their lives, their religion, and their property, to those present as well as those absent and others besides. There shall be no interference with the practice of their faith or their observance; nor any change in their rights or privileges.²⁶⁰

However, this pledge is not yet selective of Hamas. The Qur'an acknowledges Jewish legitimacy in the land. As professor Muhammad has noted "there is no specific mention of [Muslim] claim to the Holy Land in the Qur'an, but, there is support to the Jewish narrative and claim to Israel."²⁶¹

The *favor* of God towards the Jews in the land may help formulate a positive tolerance theme. Tolerance can mitigate Hamas's call for the destruction of Israel.²⁶² Quran 2:122 states, "Oh Children of Israel! Remember the special favor which I bestowed upon you, and that I preferred you to all others (for My Message)."²⁶³ The Qur'an recognizes some Jewish people as holy, "From the people of Musa (Moses) there is a community who guide and do justice in the light of truth."²⁶⁴ Therefore, the favor of God toward the Jewish people in establishing the land through faith is addressed:

Remember Musa (Moses) when said to his people: "O my people! Remember the *favor* of Allah to you, when He made prophets among you, made you kings, and gave you what He had not given to any other of the worlds. O my people! *Enter the Holy Land which God has granted to you* and do not turn back as if you do not know"²⁶⁵

²⁶⁰Muhammad Hamidullah, *Majmu' al-Watha'iq as-Siyasiya* (Cairo: Lajna at-Ta'lif wa 't-Tarjama wa 'n-Nashr, 1956), 111–2; Muhammad Al-Hussaini. "The Qur'an's Covenant with the Jewish People," 9–10.

²⁶¹Al-Hussaini, "The Qur'an's Covenant with the Jewish People," 9–10.

²⁶²Hamas Charter, Preamble. Note: The preamble of the Hamas Charter calls on the entire Islamic world to conduct a jihad against Jews and the state of Israel.

²⁶³*Qur'an* 2:122; Note: Similar in *Qur'an* 2:47.

²⁶⁴*Qur'an* 7:159.

²⁶⁵*Qur'an* 5:20–21, 25–26; Note: abrogation supported in al-Misri, *Umdat al-Salik*, 822; *Qur'an*, 7:157158; Hamas Charter, Article 11.

However, in some Muslims' narrative, God's favor toward the Jews has been replaced.²⁶⁶ They believe that the Jews were disobedient to God's instructions, and as such all claims to God's promises have been replaced or abrogated.²⁶⁷ Regardless, this can also be considered only to have *contextual* relevance and no longer applicable today.

From a Sunni law narrative, there is a Muslim precedent for peace when Muslims are in *control* of the government, but it is problematic for Jews. This form of peace is established on a subjugation and taxation-only basis. "Fight those who do not believe in Allah and the Last Day . . . being of those who have been given the Book-until they pay the poll tax out of hand and are humbled."²⁶⁸ Additionally, the Caliph Abu Bakr remarked, "Invite them [peoples we are fighting] to pay and embrace Islam. If they do not do so, invite them to pay the jizyah. If they agree to either, accept it from them and stop fighting. But if they reject both, then fight them."²⁶⁹ Historically, those who surrendered, had not submitted to Islam, but had subjected to the Sharia law and payed the jizya, were called dhimmi.²⁷⁰ According to Abu Hamed Mohammad ibn Mohammad al-Ghazali, dhimmitude was a highlight in early Sharia law:

The dhimmi must pay the jizya, the dhimmi must hang his head while the official takes hold of his beard and hits [the dhimmi] on the protuberant bone beneath his ear . . . they are not permitted to display ostensibly display their wine or church bells . . . he may not walk on the good part of the road. They [the dhimmis] have to wear [an identifying] patch [on their

²⁶⁶*Qur'an* 2:135–136 And they said: 'Become Jews or Christians, if you would be guided (to salvation).' You say (to them): 'No! (I would rather follow) The Religion of Ibrahim (Abraham), the true, and he joined not gods with Allah.' You say (to them): 'We believe in Allah, and the revelation given to us, and to Ibrahim (Abraham), Ismail (Ishmael), Ishaq (Isaac), Yaqoub (Jacob), and the Tribes, and that given to Musa (Moses) and Isa (Jesus), and that given to (all) prophets from their Lord: We make no difference between one and another of them and we bow to Allah.' See also *Qur'an* 2:135–136; *Qur'an* 3:84; Note: Confirmed in Maulana Muhammad Ali, *The Holy Qur'an* (Dublin, OH: Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isa'at Islam Lahore Inc, 2002), 62.

²⁶⁷Note: Class discussion on *abrogation* in 3102 Jihadi Information Operations, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 11 October 2011 and 10 November 2011.

²⁶⁸*Qur'an* 9:29, in al-Misri, 'Umdat al-Salik, 602.

²⁶⁹M. Sharif Basyuni, *Al-Watha'iq al-dawliyah al-ma'niyah bi huquq al-insan*, Vol II (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2003). Note: Bakr declared to his troops as they were conducting *lesser jihad*.

²⁷⁰Note: jizya is the poll tax, paid by non-Muslims, per capita, and shows a willingness to subject ones' self to the rule of law in the Islamic state.

clothing], even women, and even in the [public] baths . . . must hold their tongue.²⁷¹

Careful consideration must be made when making agreements between Islamic and Jewish cultures. Bat Ye'or, an Egyptian born Jew, describes the liberation of dhimmis:

The main cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict . . . the 'Arab' character of the Palestinian territory is inherent in the logic of jihad. Having become fay territory by conquest . . . it must remain within the dar al-Islam [and concluding] . . . Israel represents the successful national liberation of a dhimmi civilization . . . a pre-Islamic language, culture, topographical geography, and national institutions have been restored to life.²⁷²

Hamas's calls for jihad, and historic Muslim oppression of dhimmis could make Jews weary of Hamas's ability to tolerate Jews. Furthermore, context is important. Muhammad continued his message of peace for thirteen years, prior to considering the lesser jihad to capture Medina.²⁷³ Also, Muslims do not have to accept the legal rulings. They have the freedom to accept or disregard them or even to accept a fatwa from a *different* jurist.²⁷⁴ Rules of war do not always gain popular support, especially when a call for war does not come from a *legitimate* religious ruler.²⁷⁵ Similarly, the greater jihad is the more important jihad, and there are multiple interpretations of jihad:

The person who announces jihad declares so on behalf of himself not on behalf of others . . . the announcement of jihad is a personal choice. There is a misconception in the world of the meaning of the word *jihad*; it comes from *juhud* and it means effort . . . I can be a teacher and be practicing

²⁷¹Andrew Bostom, *The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005), 199–200.; Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), 196–199. Note: Al-Ghazali was a Muslim theologian (1058–1111).

²⁷²Bat Yéor, *The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians Under Islam* (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1985), 116, 122–123; Andrew G. Bostom, "Negating the Legacy of Jihad in Palestine" *Israel Affairs* 13, no 4 (October 2007): 833. Note: Yéor is an accomplished author who has briefed the United Nations.

²⁷³Reference to *Qur'an* 9:5 "kill infidels," in Thistlethwaite and Stassen. "Abrahamic Alternatives to War," 4.

²⁷⁴Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick, and David S. Power, eds, *Islamic Legal Interpretation and Their Fatwas* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 297309.

²⁷⁵Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 82–83.

jihad. I can be a builder and be practicing jihad and I can be a fighter ... therefore everything in life is jihad. All people are part of the jihad whether they know it or not.²⁷⁶

From this information, drawing a conclusion that a call for violent (lesser) jihad can be suppressed, and a call for the greater jihad (inner struggle) emphasized, has some potential *emotional resonance*. Perhaps even the call to violent jihad can be nullified, or a wedge can be drawn between the mass populace and proponents of violent conflict.

As noted earlier, some members of the Gush Emunim advocate practical messianism—a call for armed conflict to bring the Messiah to earth. However, some scholars argue that practical messianism was not a central theme in Jewish foundational texts.²⁷⁷ Instead, the focus of scripture is on the practice of *faith* in the current world. The Messiah's arrival is entirely at the will and work of God and not moved at all by men's violence. "The matter had to be left to God and to His mysterious ways of directing the world."²⁷⁸ Scholars noted that challenging the notion of violence to usher in the Messiah will not end religiously motivated violence, but leaders can *influence* the community to dissuade it.²⁷⁹ Like placating jihadi intentions, practical messianism can also potentially be subdued. Controlled behavior may provide an opportunity to dialogue on tolerance.²⁸⁰

C. PROTECTION

Both Judaism and Islam believe that all humans have a right to life and duty to protect life. Two predominant themes have become a primary religious mandate in

²⁷⁶Ahmed Yassin, interview with Miriam Shahin, "Sheikh Yassin Speaks Out," *The Middle East*, December 2001, 11. Note: this simplified version may also be a framework promoting the support of violent jihad.

²⁷⁷*Practical Messianism (Active Redemption)* belief within the Underground of Gush Emunim that inspires human actions that bring the redemptive process of restoring the land to the Jews to a zenith, and normally not associated with the mainstream ideology of Gush Emunim. Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother*, 161162; Ed Snitkoff, "My Jewish Learning: Settling All the Land," accessed 31 October 2011, <http://www.myjewishlearning.org>.

²⁷⁸Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother*, 162.

²⁷⁹Ye'or, *The Dhimmi*, 116, 122–123; Bostom, "Negating the Legacy of Jihad in Palestine," 4.

²⁸⁰Barack Obama, "Weekly Address: Carrying on the Work of our Fallen Heroes" Washington D.C. 15 September 2012, accessed 11 November 2012, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/15/weekly-address-carrying-work-our-fallen-heroes>.; Note: "I have made it clear that the United States has a profound respect for people of all faiths. We stand for *religious freedom*. And we reject the denigration of any religion."

Jewish tradition: human rights and poverty relief.²⁸¹ Maimonides argued that Jews are commanded to promote paths of peace, noting that since God is merciful, Jews should show mercy to Jews and non-Jews.²⁸² “The importance of the preservation of the Jewish life is one that all identify with . . . may they (principles) lead to the age when ‘nation will not lift up sword against nation, nor will they learn war any more.’”²⁸³ Exchanging conflict for peace is a critical topic for some reasonable Jews.

Jews make tolerance a matter of self-preservation.²⁸⁴ Based on the lessons learned after the Holocaust, “Although all humans are created ‘in the image of God’ and *every life* must be cherished, the Torah teaches Jews to place Jewish life as the highest priority.”²⁸⁵ Rabbi Yoel Ben-Nun condemned Jewish violence, such as destroying Muslim shrines in Jerusalem, as contrary to the Kooks’ and Maimonides’ teachings.²⁸⁶

²⁸¹Thistlethwaite and Stassen, “Abrahamic Alternatives to War,” 7. Note: The Jewish history of enslavement and the Holocaust predisposes Jews’ sensitivity to loss of rights and life.

²⁸²Maimonides, Laws of Kings, 12, in Thistlethwaite and Stassen, “Abrahamic Alternatives to War,” 8. Note: Maimonides (Moses ben Maimon 1135–1204 CE), regarded as the greatest figure in Jewish history since Moses who delivered the 10 commandments. The spiritual development of Judaism through him as codifier, judge and commenatator is renowned. Mishneh Torah is the first systematic exposition of Jewish religion from Dagobert Runes, *Dictionary of Judaism*, 160.

²⁸³*Isaiah 2:4*, in “Eyes Upon the Land: Publisher’s Foreword,” *Chabad-Lubavitch Sichos in English*, accessed 04 November 2011, <http://www.sichosinenglish.org/books/eyes-upon-the-land/o2.htm>. Note: Chabad-Lubavitch is not associated with Gush Emunim, but the point of exchanging war for peace is important to religious Jews.

²⁸⁴Rabbi Joseph Gutnick, in “Eyes Upon the Land: The Principles Underlying the Israel-Arab Conflict-At the Core of the Issue,” *Chabad-Lubavitch Sichos in English*.; Note: Orthodox Rabbi Gutnick is also an Australian businessman, credited with Mr. Netanyahu’s 1996 victory, claims that Jewish protection includes “The question should not be who killed more, but how to prevent killing.” At times, prevention has been used as a justification for killing others for the greater good. Netanyahu claims, “In some cases, incitement is also of a religious or quasi-religious nature—as is the cases of . . . Islamic advocates of *jihad*, Islamic holy war. And it is just these kinds of speech, assembly, and religious expression which, if properly monitored, give law enforcement agencies the warning they need in order to head off calamity. The governments of free societies charged with fighting a rising tide of terrorism are thus faced with a democratic dilemma: If they do not fight terrorism with the means available to them, they endanger their citizenry; if they do, they do, they appear to endanger the very freedoms which they are charged to protect,” Benjamin Netanyahu, *Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1995), 2930.

²⁸⁵Gutnick, in “Eyes Upon the Land: The Principles Underlying the Israel-Arab Conflict-At the Core of the Issue,” 2; Note: Quotes *Genesis 1:27*.

²⁸⁶Rabbi Yoel Ben-Nun, “The Way of the Lights and the War of the Perversion,” *Nekuda*, No 91, 15 September 1985, 11.

In Islam, similar calls for non-violence have been made. “It is unlawful to kill a non-Muslim to whom a Muslim has given his guarantee of protection.”²⁸⁷ Yaacov Bar Siman-Tov described protection in practice between Egypt and Israel, “Egyptian interests as perceived by President Mubarak have prevented thus far the deterioration of Israel–Egypt relations into the *identity* conflict pattern.”²⁸⁸ Similarly, the Qur’an shuns violence, calling for peace and reconciliation between contending brothers.²⁸⁹ Some Muslims find Hamas’s use of suicide attacks troubling.²⁹⁰ Since God is the creator of life, suicide and homicide are forbidden. Islamic law holds that only the Muslim *state* can take vengeance and only against the *criminal*, not the clan.²⁹¹ According to classical Islamic scholarship, terrorism and irregular acts of violence are disapproved,²⁹² which creates room to dissuade proponents of violence. Snow and colleagues’s research demonstrates that it is possible to link both “individual and social movement organizations (SMO) interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary.”²⁹³ Promoting the protection of their identity while considering co-existence with other religions may resonate with the target audiences.

D. FORGIVENESS

Forgiveness is a central theme in both Judaism and Islam, but how they conceive of it differs. Forgiveness is obligatory for Jews. Yehudith Auerbach argues that

²⁸⁷al-Misri, ‘*Umdat al-Salik*, 603–604.

²⁸⁸Yaacov Bar Siman-Tov, “Israel-Egypt: Stable Peace?” in Yehudith Auerbach, “Forgiveness and Reconciliation: The Religious Dimension,” 483; Note: Professor Siman-Tov is Chair of the study of peace and regional cooperation and Professor of International Relations at Hebrew University since 1979.

²⁸⁹Yaacov Bar Siman-Tov, “Israel-Egypt: Stable Peace?” in Yehudith Auerbach, “Forgiveness and Reconciliation: The Religious Dimension,” 9.

²⁹⁰Franz Rosenthal, “On Suicide in Islam,” *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol 66, 1946, 239–259. Note: Acts such as *suicide* are strictly punished in the hereafter by a perpetual re-enactment of the death in the manner that was chosen. Hamas was the first Sunni Islam group to practice suicide bombings.

²⁹¹Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 181– 187, in Aboul-Enein, Youssef and Sherifa Zuhur, *Islamic Rulings on Warfare*, 15.

²⁹²Tamara Sonn, “Irregular Warfare and Terrorism in Islam: Asking the Right Questions,” in Aboul-Enein, Youssef and Sherifa Zuhur, *Islamic Rulings on Warfare*, 29; Rapoport argues that “compelling a people to ... leave its own land (Israel) is another (thing),” Rapoport, David C. “Four Waves,” 67.

²⁹³Snow et al. in “Frame Alignment Processes,” 464.

forgiveness and reconciliation must precede peace, because peace without reconciliation forfeits a repaired and renewed relationship, essential to political life, the economy, and a strong civil life.²⁹⁴ The Talmud is firm on forgiveness and provides a process: “One who has sinned against his fellow-man *must* say to him, ‘I have acted wrongly against you.’ . . . the aggrieved party [should] accept the apology when made to him and not nurse his grievance.”²⁹⁵ Maimonides also led by example when he devised Jewish rituals of *teshuva*, or repentance.²⁹⁶ For Muslims, forgiveness is strictly a personal matter. According to Qur’an 5:45 “If anyone forgives the revenge by way of charity, it is an act of peace for himself.”²⁹⁷ Mahmud Shaltut has noted that the Prophet restrained his followers who aimed to *retaliate*.²⁹⁸ Additionally, the Qur’an “stresses forgiveness, calling it a higher virtue to forgive than to bear hatred.”²⁹⁹ A dialogue on forgiveness is relevant in alleviating the tension from past hurts.

E. COMMON GROUND

There is common ground between the groups. Authorizing the controversial *autonomy* of the Palestinian Authority under Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank is suggested by some of the Gush Emunim and Hamas. In April 2006, Hamas’s foreign minister, Mahmoud al-Zahhar, sent a letter to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, declaring that his government would be willing to live in peace, side by side with ‘its neighbors’, based on a two-state solution.³⁰⁰ Similarly, in 2007, Hamas leader Khalid Mish’al made a statement about Hamas’ willingness to accept a state in the West Bank

²⁹⁴Yehudith Auerbach, “Forgiveness and Reconciliation: The Religious Dimension” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 17, no. 3 (2005): 475. Note: Auerbach is a professor at Bar Ilan University in Israel.

²⁹⁵A. Cohen, 228–229. Note: referencing *Job 33:27, Leviticus 19:18, Judges 5:31*.; Jewish Rabbinical scholars Rabbi Akiva said regarding Leviticus 19:18 that “this is the fundamental rule of the Torah,” and Rabbi Hillel paraphrased “What is hateful to you, do not do to others,” Scherman, *Tanach: The Stone Edition*, 293.

²⁹⁶Toft, Philpott and Shah, *God’s Century*, 178.

²⁹⁷*Qur’an 5:45*.

²⁹⁸Shaltut, “The Koran and Fighting,” in Aboul-Enein, Youssef and Sherifa Zuhur. *Islamic Rulings on Warfare*, 11. Note: Shaltut is a professor at Sunni al-Azhar University in Egypt.

²⁹⁹*Qur’an 42:37–43*, in Thistlethwaite and Stassen, “Abrahamic Alternatives to War,” 9.

³⁰⁰Hroub, *Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide*, 40.

and Gaza.³⁰¹ Some on the fringe of Gush Emunim, like Zevulun Hammer, claimed that settlements should not be abandoned, but *autonomy* and other arrangements for peace should not be ruled out.³⁰² Contrary to popular belief, perhaps there is a negotiation area within the groups, between the bold, and those not ready to publically discuss peace.³⁰³

There is a more open process to discuss the religious arguments called “scriptural reasoning.” Islamic and Jewish texts are openly analyzed in a parallel, deliberately juxtaposed manner.³⁰⁴ This is an alternative to religious scholars citing specific inflammatory texts from each book.³⁰⁵ An example for dialogue occurred in 2007 when Imams from the London Islamic Cultural Center and London Central Mosque sanctioned lay Muslims to meet with Jews (and others) for interfaith discussion.³⁰⁶

Similarly, in 2008 inter-faith scholars produced two recommendedations for reducing *violence*. Jewish scholars recommended emphasizing a more metaphorical interpretation of scripture to challenge violent interpretations of it. Similarly, Muslim authors advocated an appropriately translated approach toward the Qur’an, used in the context of the larger corpus of the Qur’an, to emphasize moderation. Specifically the scholars recommended “textual and historical criticism, better translation and a more complete understanding of passages’ *contexts* within the greater corpus of scripture and

³⁰¹Tamimi, *Hamas: A History From Within*, 8; Note: see also page 34 for Khalid Mish’al’s statement.

³⁰²Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord*, 109. Note: Hammer was minister of education and culture under Israeli Prime Minister Begin, premises called a heresy and contradiction to Gush Emunim, and was banned from most Gush settlements after his statements.

³⁰³Scham and Abu-Irshaid. “ Hamas Ideological Rigidity and Political Flexibility.” Note: “ Hamas has indicated on a number of occasions its willingness to accede to a *hudna* with Israel, assuming basic Palestinian rights . . . are agreed to first. Palestinian legitimacy is a term employed by Hamas to describe its willingness to consider accepting a binding peace treaty . . . so long as the treaty is first ratified by the Palestinian people in a referendum. Although Hamas would not directly participate in peace negotiations with Israel.” Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord*, 109. Note: “ A ‘dovish fringe’ also exists . . . from granting administrative autonomy . . . to relinquishing certain densely populated Arab areas.”

³⁰⁴Steven Kepnes, “ A Handbook for Scriptural Reasoning,” *Modern Theology*, June (2006) 367–383.

³⁰⁵Al-Hussaini. “ The Qur’an’s Covenant with the Jewish People,” 10. Note: Instead of jihad or practical messianism, a more nuanced approach is considered.

³⁰⁶Al-Hussaini. “ The Qur’an’s Covenant with the Jewish People,” 10; Muhammad Fathallah, Salah al-Ansari and Muhammad al-Salamoni, “ Fatwa on Scriptural Reasoning,” Accessed 18 October 2011, <http://www.scripturalreasoning.co.uk>. Note: Senior Islamic authorities in London issued a fatwa to sanction this analysis.

tradition can help call religious ideologies of violence into question.”³⁰⁷ These two examples hold promise for promoting dialogue.

³⁰⁷Thistlethwaite and Stassen, “Abrahamic Alternatives to War,” 5.

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IV. CONCLUSION: TOWARD PEACE

If your enemy is hungry, give him bread to eat; and if he is thirsty, give him water to drink; For so you will heap coals of fire on his head, and the Lord will reward you.³⁰⁸

— *Proverbs 25:21–22*

And (remember) when Allah said: ‘O Isa, (Jesus)! I will take you and raise you to Myself and clear you (of the lies) of those who blaspheme; and I will make those who follow you above those who reject faith, to the Day of Judgment.³⁰⁹

— *Qur’an 3:55*

This thesis has highlighted three general implications on the hypotheses.³¹⁰ One, it has shown that historically U.S. policymakers have consistently ignored the importance of religion, thereby leading to both heightened insecurities and increased tension. It would serve the U.S. diplomatic interests to develop a strategic narrative that considers religious interests. A second is that in their politicized religious frameworks, fundamentalist Hamas and Gush Emunim strongly object to permanently conceding the land into a sovereign Israel and Palestine. There is no permanent zone of agreement on land sovereignty because in each narrative, the cause is seen as legitimate and the opposing group’s presence as invalid. Both groups have similar claims: Abrahamic

³⁰⁸See also: “A king is not saved by a great army . . . Behold, the eye of Hashem (God) is on those who fear Him, upon those who await his kindness,” *Psalm 33:16–18*; “Deceit is in the heart of those who devise evil, but counselors of peace have joy,” *Proverbs 12:20*; “Thus says the Lord: ‘I will return to Zion, and dwell in the midst of Jerusalem. Jerusalem shall be called the City of Truth, the Mountain of the Lord of hosts, the Holy Mountain,’” *Zechariah 8:3*; “Behold, I will save My people from the land of the east and from the land of the west; I will bring them back, and they shall dwell in the midst of Jerusalem.” *Zechariah 8:7*; “The temple is not for man but for the Lord God.” *1 Chronicles 29:1*.

³⁰⁹*Qur’an 3:55*, in al-Misri, ‘*Umdat al-Salik*, 603.

³¹⁰*Hypothesis A*—Ambiguous and contradictory U.S. narratives regarding Israel and Hamas increase space for conflicting political and religious entities. *Hypothesis B*—Dogmatic religious interpretations increase the intensity of the conflict. *Hypothesis C*—Promoting peaceful co-existence major themes within each religion decreases the intensity of the conflict.

ancestry, God sanctioned land rights, centrality of Jerusalem, and land centered jihad/practical messianism. Finally, the scriptures of each tradition contain within them the frame and theme resources for promoting the peaceful co-existence of both groups.³¹¹ Without integrating moderate themes in the battle of narratives, Hamas will likely perpetuate jihad until it gains an Islamic state in West Bank and Gaza.

In order to win the strategic narrative, a focus on understanding and reframing the sources of identity is necessary. For Gush Emunim, identity is based on *scripture*, which is tied to the land.³¹² For Hamas, identity is based on *doctrine*, and the inner struggle is the important struggle.^{313,314} Therefore, de-emphasizing the zeal for land and focusing on peaceful practice of religion may prove fruitful.

The *identity* issue has been elevated to an impossible standard of perfection. The persuasive ideologue Sayyid Qutb argued on behalf of what he called progressive revelation, which holds that Allah's will is revealed only to those willing to act upon it. And for those willing to act, decisive steps to create a pure Islamic-led state are

³¹¹*Temporary Peace*—Cessation of armed conflict for the purpose of subjecting ones' self to the rule of law in a particular state; Note: It is difficult to recommend any course of action without completely alienating the other position. Promoting peaceful co-existence bargaining points within each religion could decrease violent behavior.

³¹²Rabbi Avraham Kook, in Sprinzak, "Fundamentalism, Terrorism, and Democracy." Rav Zvi Yehuda Kook, "Honest We Shall Be: In the Land and in the Torah" in Ehud Sprinzak, "Fundamentalism, Terrorism, and Democracy"; "The temple is not for man but for the Lord God." *1 Chronicles 29:1*.

³¹³Al-Hussaini, "The Qur'an's Covenant with the Jewish People," 9– 10; Note: Anna Simons argued, "as committed as many Islamists are to achieving social justice and improving social welfare according to religious prescripts, they do not just seek to *better* Muslims' lives in this world," Simons argued that when other societies encroach upon the identity of Islam, Islamists fight to *preserve identity*. "Making Enemies: An Anthropology of Islamist Terror," 6

³¹⁴Note: see also pages 39, 40, 51, 52 and 62 on greater and lesser jihad.

essential.^{315,316} However, Qutb's view on a pure state is problematic. The *perfection expectation* implied in abrogation must be addressed. Muslims claim the Jews disobeyed the law, thus invalidating Jew claim to the land. By that standard, any Muslim imperfection in following the Quran would similarly invalidate Hamas's claim.

To focus on the *life* promotion theme, the patriarchs' examples can be used as a guide. This theme can moderate the Hamas and Gush Emunim beliefs on jihad and practical messianism. Through Abraham, *all* families of the earth are to be blessed.³¹⁷ King David refrained from exterminating the seven Canaanite nations and waited for God's will in taking action. Muhammad called for jihad, but if the enemy sought peace, he sought peace also, maintained his commitments, and respected Jewish faith.³¹⁸ In both the patriarch's examples, co-existent peace can *resonate*, but not subjugation.

The moderate *co-existence* narrative requires also a tolerance sub-theme, based on context and scriptural reasoning, in order for it to resonate.³¹⁹ Joshua utilized warfare to establish the twelve Jewish tribes' ability to practice Judaism in Canaan.³²⁰ Similarly, Muhammad utilized warfare to establish the religion in Medina and Mecca.³²¹

³¹⁵Qutb, Sayyid, *Milestones*, Salimiah (Kuwait: International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations. 1978 [written 1966]), 17– 18, 28, 146. Note: Saudi Arabian "Rabi al-Madkhali was quite skillful at discrediting his opponents—a tactic was to call jihadis "Qutbis" rather than Salafis, since they agreed with the political doctrines of Sayyid Qutb, a leading jihadi thinker who was executed by the Egyptian government in the 60s. Doing this denied them the legitimacy of being known as Salafis, followers of the pious forefathers, and suggested that they were members of a deviant sect. To this end, another of Madkhali's effective tactics was to force an opponent to acknowledge that Sayyid Qutb, whose teachings he followed, had made a number of theological statements that were at variance with orthodoxy; thus, his followers were heretics too." Jarret Brachman and William McCants "Stealing Al-Qa'ida's Playbook," 01 February 2006, accessed 11 September 2012, <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/stealing-al-qaidas-playbook>.

³¹⁶In Reilly's view, it is not possible to have a *pure* state. He claims "moral legitimacy is the substance of wars of ideas." In order for Islam to succeed in building a nation, there would need to be a *perfect* person, with *perfect* power, to implement this system that some ideologues of Islam prescribe. This naturally leads to a totalitarian state in order to fulfill these objectives. In this view, Islam is aligned exactly with totalitarianism. Robert Reilly, Naval Postgraduate School, 02 November 2012.

³¹⁷*Genesis* 12:1–3

³¹⁸*Qur'an* 8:61.

³¹⁹Note: Iran has members of parliament for minority parties, Zoroastrian, Jew, Christian. Promoting a life of peace could be based on a new framework-*tikkum olam*, or repair of the world.

³²⁰*Deuteronomy* 6:4–5, 14–15, *Joshua* 1–4; *Proverbs* 16:7.

³²¹"History of Islam," *Religion Facts*, accessed 14 May 2012, <http://www.religionfacts.com>.

Muhammad tolerated the Jewish faith and practice.³²² Both Judaism and Islam share monotheistic practice and invite others to join their religion. A new co-existence dialogue could preserve life by focusing on tolerating Muslims worshipping in mosques and Jews worshipping in synagogues. Protection of human life is a shared practical component. The Tractate Sanhedrin states, “Whoever destroys a Jewish life is considered to have *destroyed an entire world*. And whoever saves a Jewish life is considered to have *saved an entire world*.”³²³ Similarly, the Qur’an argues that if “anyone killed a person-unless it was for murder or mischief-it would be as if he *killed all of mankind*. And if anyone saved a life, it would be as if he had *saved the lives of all mankind*.”^{324,325}

A moderate *co-existence* strategic narrative must also include a forgiveness theme. Historically, the 622 to 632 schism between Jews and Muslims must be considered in *context*. On his deathbed, Muhammad forbade any Jews or Christians who rejected him from living in the *Arabian Peninsula*. He called for Muslims to not trust Jews only while he was fighting for Mecca, which was a break from his earlier call to make peace if the enemy seeks peace.³²⁶ Forgiveness is a matter of personal choice for Muslims and a Jewish mandate. By example, *Jesus of Nazareth*, who is renowned in the Qur’an, called Rabbi by the Sanhedrin, and revered by the Jewish Pharisee Nicodemus, spoke “*love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, bless those who curse you, and*

³²²In estimated 622 CE, the Qur’an acknowledged that monasteries, churches, and synagogues were true places of worship- *Qur’an 22:40*.

³²³Tractate Sanhedrin 4:5, in “Eyes Upon the Land: The Principles Underlying the Israel-Arab Conflict-At the Core of the Issue,” *Chabad-Lubavitch Sichos in English*; See also *Proverbs 12:20*—“Deceit is in the heart of those who devise evil, but counselors of *peace* have joy.”

³²⁴*Qur’an 5:32*.

³²⁵*Qur’an 9:1* “A declaration of immunity from Allah and His Messenger to those of the idolaters with whom you made an agreement;” in al-Misri, ‘Umdat al-Salik, 605.

³²⁶*Qur’an 8:61*

pray for those who spitefully use you.”³²⁷ This could resonate with some Jews,³²⁸ and Muslims who particularly revere Jesus.³²⁹ Gush veteran Abraham Mintz admitted “we should not allow hatred to blind us, nor should we let love blur our vision. We are ready to have good relations with anyone, to honor and love him. We are even ready to restore sinners to our midst, but not when they hold a knife in their hands.”³³⁰ Muhammad even repeated Jesus’s words, “*Forgive them Lord, for they know not what they do.*”³³¹ As mediators of forgiveness, do we care more about land, or about people, and caring for basic human needs? Ultimately, satisfied people have to execute the law, so the law in itself actually accomplishes nothing. Many Muslims believe the heart is the issue, as cited by Al-Banna, “What is the greater jihad? The jihad of the heart, or the jihad against one’s

³²⁷Luke 6:27–28, 32. Also, “To him who strikes you on the one cheek, offer the other also . . . and just as you want men to do to you, you also do to them likewise.” Note: Rabbi Nicodemus stated “Rabbi, we know that You [Jesus] are a teacher come from God; for no one can do these signs that You do unless God is with him.” *Jesus* answered and said to Nicodemus, ‘Most assuredly, I say to you, unless one is born again, he cannot see the Kingdom of god.’ *John* 3:1–12. Matthew 6:14 “If you forgive men their trespasses, God will forgive you.” *Qur’an* 3:55 “I will make those who follow you (*Jesus*) above those who reject faith, to the Day of Judgment.” *Qur’an* 3:37–38 “O Mary! Be devout towards thy Lord, and prostrate thyself.” *Qur’an* 19:16–22 “We sent our spirit Gabriel to her, and he took before her the form of a perfect man. She said: ‘I fly for refuge from thee to the God of Mercy. If thou fearest Him, be gone from me.’ He said: ‘I am only a messenger of thy Lord, that I may bestow on thee a holy son.’ She said: ‘How shall I have a son, when man hath never touched me? and I am not unchaste! He said: ‘So shall it be. Thy Lord hath said: ‘Easy is this with me; and we will make him a sign to mankind, and a mercy from us. For this is a thing decreed.’”; “It could be argued that the Bible takes this view: The Flood in Genesis ushers in not the end but a new beginning; the Second Coming [of Jesus] in Revelation features travail, but also a 1,000-year era of peace.” John Arquilla “The (B)end of History” *Foreign Policy*, 11 January 2012, accessed 27 December 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/27/the_bend_of_history?page=full.

³²⁸Richard Robinson, [jfw] *The Messiahship of Jesus* [video file] 16 January 2007, accessed 20 November 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8KmMTRQ8w-0&feature=player_embedded; *What Proof do you have that Jesus was the Messiah?* 30 June 2011, accessed 20 November 2012, <http://www.jewsforjesus.org/jesus/prooffessay>.

³²⁹*Qur’an* 3:40 “Remember when the angel said, ‘O Mary! Verily God announceth to thee the Word from Him: His name shall be Messiah *Jesus* the son of Mary, illustrious in this world, and in the next and one of those who have near access to God.’” Note: “The (Jewish) writers of the New Testament asserted that the Old Testament spoke of a coming Messiah and quoted from it extensively to prove their point. Even Jesus himself—whom many Jewish people declared to be a good rabbi and teacher—said to those who sat under his teaching, “How foolish you are, and how *slow of heart* to believe all that the prophets have spoken! Did not the Messiah have to suffer these things and then enter his glory?” And beginning with Moses and all the Prophets, he explained to them what was said in all the Scriptures concerning himself.” (*Luke* 24:25–27); Many Jews do not consider Jesus to be authoritative. Robinson, *The Messiahship of Jesus*.

³³⁰Lustick, Ian. *For the Land and the Lord*, 127.

³³¹Ibn Sad al-Tabaqa Al Kubra 2, 142, Beirut 1957, in Thistlethwaite and Stassen, “Abrahamic Alternatives to War,” 9. Jesus spoke “Forgive them Father, for they know not what they do.” *Luke* 23:34. Muhammad was initially taught by Christians and Jews, before making an independent start.

ego.”³³² Mistrust between Jews and Muslims can be alleviated through forgiveness; a *relationship* can begin on this theme.

As Toft et al. note, however, a peaceful solution to the conflict will almost certainly need to be brokered by independent religious actors who can promote a moderate *co-existence* strategic narrative.³³³ Thus, the United States should try to identify an independent organization, such as the Catholic lay organization Sant’Egidio, which mediated the remarkable 1992 peace agreement in Mozambique. After sixteen years of civil war and a million deaths, both parties finally showed an interest in a settlement, and Sant’Egidio helped mediate nine rounds of peace negotiations. Sant’Egidio was successful because over the years it had formed a network of friendships in Mozambique, putting its “faith into practice by gathering regularly to pray together and to befriend the city’s poorest inhabitants.”^{334, 335} In such an approach, the U.S. State Department’s role would be to hold off antagonistic political actors, allowing a Sant’Egidio-like organization have space to do its work.³³⁶ So, the United States must cultivate relationships with non-state actors who do not have a vested interest in the outcome of the conflict.

In closing, narratives that respect individual life are promising. All pertinent religions acknowledge obedience to the will of God in some form. Muslims mandate *submission* with all of one’s own self-efforts, Jews call for *loving* God with all one’s heart, mind, and soul, and Christians, as mediators, call for *surrendering* one’s self to the will of God. This would require *unmerited favor*, but the research demonstrates that

³³²Hasan Al-Banna, *Jihad*, in Jim Lacey, *The Cannons of Jihad: Terrorists’ Strategy for Defeating America*, 10. Note: Al-Banna was cited in the Hamas Charter. The thesis author recommends a break from legalistic interpretations of texts and doctrine and focus on *reaching the heart* of the population.

³³³Toft, Philpott and Shah, *God’s Century*, 176–177,

³³⁴Toft, Philpott and Shah, *God’s Century*, 174–175. Note: Sant’Egidio has grown to over 50,000 members, over seventy countries, and helped open up religious freedom, brought economic aid to Mozambique, and assisted with social needs.

³³⁵Toft, Philpott and Shah, *God’s Century*, 174.

³³⁶Toft, Philpott, and Shah, *God’s Century*, 174–178.

loving one's enemy is God's will.³³⁷ President Abraham Lincoln patiently endured the storm of extreme violence until peaceful reconciliation with the prayer method, "I'm driven to my knees by the conviction that I have nowhere else to go" and sought "with malice toward none, with charity toward all."³³⁸

³³⁷Jesus' words, "Love your enemies," *Matthew 5:44*; King Solomon, "prior to honor there is humility" *Proverbs 18:12*; "You shall love your fellow as yourself" *Leviticus 19:18*; "If they incline towards peace, then incline towards it also" *Qur'an 5:32*; "Killing a person is like killing mankind" *Qur'an 8:61*. All above words elevate the sanctity of life and promote peaceful co-existence.

³³⁸Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Speech, 4 March 1865, *National Day of Prayer Task Force San Diego*, accessed 16 November 2011, <http://www.ndpsandiego.org/tiki-index.php>. "May not alienate this best part of the land, for it is holy to the Lord." *Ezekiel 48:14* "Land you shall divide by lot as an inheritance among the tribes of Israel, and these are their portions says the Lord God." *Exodus 48:29*.

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